



ISSN: 2161-1076

Surgery: Current Research

Open Access

# The Impact of Inter-Center Competition on Liver Transplant Practices and Outcomes

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# Liver Allocation Proceeds by “Sickest First” Principle

Acute “Fulminant” Liver Failure (Expected Lifespan <7 days without Transplantation)



Status 1  
Highest Priority

or

Chronic Liver Failure



Waitlist Mortality Priority based on MELD score

# MELD and Waitlist Mortality




Figure 2. Box plots of mortality risk on the waiting list, by MELD score.

# Liver Transplant Waitlist

Offer List 1

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

A6

A7

A8

A9

Status 1

high

MELD

low

Donor X (22year old MVA)

“Match”

Expected Outcome

Risk A1/RiskX

# Transplant Center Report Card

## Center 1


Post-transplant Outcomes ( 01/01/2009-06/30/2011)	1 Year			Tal
	Observed	Expected	Statistical Significance of Difference	
Adult graft survival (based on 301 transplants) (%)	90.46	87.15	Statistically Higher (b)	
Adult patient survival (based on 295 transplants) (%)	91.36	89.83	Not Significantly Different (a)	
Pediatric graft survival (based on 35 transplants) (%)	85.71	87.37	Not Significantly Different (a)	
Pediatric patient survival (based on 31 transplants) (%)	93.55	93.43	Not Significantly Different (a)	

## Center 2

Post-transplant Outcomes ( 01/01/2009-06/30/2011)	1 Year			Tal
	Observed	Expected	Statistical Significance of Difference	
Adult graft survival (based on 33 transplants) (%)	75.00	89.41	Statistically Lower (b)	
Adult patient survival (based on 31 transplants) (%)	79.84	92.29	Statistically Lower (b)	
Pediatric graft survival (%)	NA	NA	NA	
Pediatric patient survival (%)	NA	NA	NA	

# Waitlist/Transplants/Deaths by Year


**WAITING LIST:** National liver-transplant statistics show that many people die while waiting for donor organs.



SOURCE: SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS

ALBERT CORONA/THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE

# The Changing Liver Donor Population 1989-2009



1989

2009

No ECD Donors  
No Matching considerations Necessary  
No Special Informed Consent

# The Older Donor European Challenges

Mario Angelico M.D.




Fig. 1.

Age distribution of overall donor population. Continuous line: estimated normal density (mean = 52.9, SD = 18.9). Dashed line: empirical density (kernel estimate).

The Bad News: Donor age will continue to increase

The Good News: There is a great potential in the US to expand utilization of older donors for Liver Transplantation




# Donor Risk Index

## Characteristics Associated with Liver Graft Failure

**Table 3:** Donor factors significantly associated with liver allograft failure (1998–2002)\*

Donor parameter	RR	95% CI	p-Value
Age			
<40	1.00		
40–49	1.17	1.08–1.26	0.0002
50–59	1.32	1.21–1.43	<0.0001
60–69	1.53	1.39–1.68	<0.0001
>70	1.65	1.46–1.87	<0.0001
African-American race (vs White)	1.19	1.10–1.29	<0.0001
Donor height (per 10 cm decrease)	1.07	1.04–1.09	<0.0001
COD = CVA	1.16	1.08–1.24	<0.0001
COD = Other†	1.20	1.03–1.40	0.018
DCD	1.51	1.19–1.91	0.0006
Partial/Split	1.52	1.27 – 1.83	<0.0001

# Liver Transplant Waitlist



# Organ Acceptance Decisions in Liver Transplantation: Howard Model








Figure 4: Accept and Reject Regions in Howard [2002] Model

# Matching Donors and Recipients



[Lee KW](#), [Simpkins CE](#), [Montgomery RA](#), [Locke JE](#), [Segev DL](#), [Maley WR](#). [Factors affecting graft survival after liver transplantation from donation after cardiac death donors.](#)

Transplantation 2006; 82: 1683-8

# Organ Acceptance Decisions in Liver Transplantation: Alagosz Model





Figure 5: Alternative Accept and Reject Regions

# Matching Donors and Recipients:

## “Window of Appropriate Use”



\*DCD, Split, Older Donor.....Steatosis

On competition...

# Adam Smith

*In general, if any branch of trade..... be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will always be the more so.*

*The Wealth Of Nations, Book II, Chapter II, p.329, para. 106.*

**Hypothesis:** “Local Competition Between Liver Transplant Centers Within a DSA should Advantage the Public”


1. Improved Outcomes
2. Greater Access/Improved Organ Utilization
3. Decreased Cost

# Distribution of Liver Transplant Centers

## UNOS Regions



## DSAs/Centers



The competitive environment for organs varies greatly at the local level. (1-6 Liver Centers/DSA)



# Overall Patient Survival


## Non-Competitive(NC) vs. Competitive(C) Centers

	<b>NC(22%)</b>	<b>C(78%)</b>	p-value
1 year actual Survival	88.0%	85.3%	<0.001
1 year expected Survival	88.3%	86.4%	<0.001
3 year actual Survival	80.8%	76.5%	<0.001
3 year expected Survival	80.2%	77.4%	<0.001

2003-2010

# 3 Year Patient Survival MELD era (n=375 observations)


Observed



Centers/DSA	Mean			
1	82.4%	<b>A</b>		
3	79.3%	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	
2	77.2%		<b>B</b>	
6	76.2%		<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>
4	75.8%		<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>
5	72.3%			<b>C</b>


Student's t  $\alpha=0.01$

Expected



Centers/DSA	Mean			
1	80.5%	<b>A</b>		
2	78.2%		<b>B</b>	
3	77.3%		<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>
4	76.2%			<b>C</b>
6	75.8%			<b>C</b>
5	75.5%			<b>C</b>

logObs - logExp



Centers/DSA	Mean			
3	0.024	<b>A</b>		
1	0.021	<b>A</b>		
6	0.000	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	
4	-0.010	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	
2	-0.017	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	
5	-0.058			<b>B</b>

# What is the Impact of Competitive Environment on?

1. Post Transplant Outcomes?
2. Organ Utilization?
3. Disease Severity at Transplantation
4. Listing/Organ acceptance

# Methods

All liver transplants from the MELD era (2003 and 2009) were studied using the UNOS database (n=38,385). Competitive environment for a local market was stratified into tertiles using the **Herfindahl–Hirschman Index\* (HHI)**.


**Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)** a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers.

**Example 1:** A market consisting of four centers with shares of 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%, the HHI = 2,600 ( $30^2 + 30^2 + 20^2 + 20^2$ ).

**Example 2:** A market consisting of three centers with shares of 90%, 7% and 3%, the HHI = 8158 ( $90^2 + 7^2 + 3^2$ ).


**Example 3:** A market consisting of a single center. HHI=10,000 ( $100^2$ )

# Distribution of HHI




HHI

# Post Transplant Survival and Competition




# Recipient Risk and Competition

Transplant MELD vs. HHI




MELD at Transplant by Competitive Position




# Donor Risk and Competition

## DRI vs. HHI




## DRI Quartile by Competitive Group






# Listed/Transplanted Ratio and Competition



Listed/p.m.p and Transplanted/p.m.p. by HHI tertile



Listed/Transplanted ratio by HHI (OPO Center Data)

# Impact of Competition

## Univariate and Multivariate Analysis

		Univariate			Multivariate		
Risk of patient death (D)							
Characteristic	HR	95% CI	p-value	HR	95% CI	p-value	
HHI tertile							
1 (low comp, >0.57)	1.00			1.00			
2 (mid comp, 0.38-0.57)	1.05	1.00-1.11	0.037	1.04	0.99-1.09	0.133	
3 (high comp, <0.38)	1.23	1.18-1.29	<0.001	1.04	0.99-1.10	0.119	

Comparison of donor and recipient characteristics by DSA competition level (described by HHI tertile) (characteristics significant in SRTR reports.)

# Competition for Limited Resources in Liver Transplantation

Poorer Outcomes

Increased Disease Severity/  
Resource Utilization and Cost

Adam Smith??

Greatly Improved Access to  
Listing

Small Improvement In Access  
to Transplantation

# “Tragedy of the Commons”

“We can make little progress ... until we explicitly exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith, ... the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, "led by an invisible hand to promote ... the public interest"

Garritt Hardin, Science Dec. 13, 1968

Hardin’s Example: Herdsman sharing a common pasture are each individually motivated to add more cattle to their herd. The result is an overgrazed common in which the animals starve.

Two Dead Since Arizona Medicaid Program Slashed Transplant Coverage



(ABCNEWS.com)

AUTO START: ON OFF

abc WORLD NEWS  
WITH DIANE SAWYER

By JANE E. ALLEN (@JaneEAllenABC), ABC News Medical Unit  
Jan. 6, 2011

# Proposed Mechanism: Match List Competition

No Competition

A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A

Absence of  
Competition  
Accept  
“Best Match”

Equal Competition


A  
B  
C  
D  
E  
A  
B  
C  
D

Under Competition  
Accept  
“Maximum Tolerated  
Risk”

Dominant Competitor

A  
B  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
A  
B


# Donor/Recipient Matching in Liver Transplantation, the Advantage of List Dominance (ECD Donor)




# Outcome vs. Market Position

MC=Monopoly Center, EC=Equal-Competitor,  
DC Dominant Competitor, NDC Non-Dominant Competitor


Observed 3 Year Patient  
Survival



Expected 3 Year Patient  
Survival



Observed/Expected



# Competition, Utilization, and MELD

Less Competition

More Competition



-Opportunity for better control of  
Donor/Recipient Risk and Matching

-Decreased Access to listing

-Risk Aversion/Decreased Utilization

-Inability to control match risk for both  
donors and recipients

-Poorer Outcomes/Higher Cost  
in “Sickest First” Paradigm



# What Should We Compete For?

How do we Avoid a “Race to the Bottom” in  
“Sickest first” Allocation?

Is it time for the Liver transplant community  
to better balance utility against  
disease severity in allocation policy?

What can be done on a local level to mitigate the  
negative influence of competition

# Acknowledgements

John Roberts M.D., UCSF

Jennifer Dodge M.S., UCSF

Harry Paarsch, Ph.D. ,University of Melbourne

Alberto Segre Ph.D., University of Iowa