Mode of introduction |
Category |
Mechanism |
Conclusions of Pathway Analyses |
Relative likelihood (low/medium/high) |
Trend |
Accidental reintroduction |
Biosafety incident at a known WHO repository |
A |
Laboratory acquired infection or accidental release from WHO repository (restricted to CDC and Vector) |
Low |
Decreasing |
Biosafety incident outside of a known repository |
B1 |
Unknown, archived and untested/misdiagnosed clinical sample |
Low |
Decreasing |
B2 |
Unknown, archived and tested, but unlabeled sample |
Low |
Decreasing |
B3 |
Rediscovered sample labeled as smallpox |
Low |
Decreasing |
Environmental resurrection / mutation |
C1 |
Archived outside of the lab |
Low |
Decreasing |
C2 |
Natural orthopox mutation into virus that can cause smallpox-like illness |
Low |
Constant |
Deliberate reintroduction |
Biosecurity incident: theft from a known repository |
D1 |
Insider theft |
Medium |
Constant |
D2 |
Outsider theft |
Medium |
Decreasing |
D3 |
Collusion |
Medium |
Constant |
Biotechnology |
E1 |
De novo synthesis |
Medium |
Increasing |
E2 |
Deliberate mutation of a related orthopox virus |
Medium |
Increasing |
State illicit weapons program |
F1 |
State retained it post-eradication and post-consolidation of smallpox samples into 2 repositories |
Low |
Constant * |
F2 |
State acquired it post eradication: accidental discovery, acquired from other state program, theft from repository, biotech |
Low |
Constant+ |