Mode of introduction

Category

Mechanism

Conclusions of Pathway Analyses

Relative likelihood (low/medium/high)

Trend

Accidental reintroduction

Biosafety incident at a known WHO repository

A

Laboratory acquired infection or accidental release from WHO repository (restricted to CDC and Vector)

Low

Decreasing

Biosafety incident outside of a known repository

B1

Unknown, archived and untested/misdiagnosed clinical sample

Low

Decreasing

B2

Unknown, archived and tested, but unlabeled sample

Low

Decreasing

B3

Rediscovered sample labeled as smallpox

Low

Decreasing

Environmental resurrection / mutation

C1

Archived outside of the lab

Low

Decreasing

C2

Natural orthopox mutation into virus that can cause smallpox-like illness

Low

Constant

Deliberate reintroduction

Biosecurity incident: theft from a known repository

D1

Insider theft

Medium

Constant

D2

Outsider theft

Medium

Decreasing

D3

Collusion

Medium

Constant

Biotechnology

E1

De novo synthesis

Medium

Increasing

E2

Deliberate mutation of a related orthopox virus

Medium

Increasing

State illicit weapons program

F1

State retained it post-eradication and post-consolidation of smallpox samples into 2 repositories

Low

Constant *

F2

State acquired it post eradication: accidental discovery, acquired from other state program, theft from repository, biotech

Low

Constant+

The table lists potential pathways for accidental or deliberate release of smallpox virus. See text for further details on mechanisms and associated relative likelihood. * Security experts disagree as to how this may change over time, as discussed in the paper. + Most of these pathways are decreasing, but the biotech pathway is expected to increase with time.
Table 1: Main pathways for possible recurrence of smallpox.