Probability of Failure Exclusion Detection Alert & Warning Control & Prevention Transmission Communication Investigation Remediation
Low Highly restricted access to building, for public   No external access to HVAC vents or building systems Fast-reacting biosensor network High biosensor sampling rate Training security personnel Bioattack-specific alarm, linked to detection system HVAC Purge System HVAC High performance filters and air cleaners Separate ventilation systems for public areas, the main building, and escape routes PPE available to all occupants Planned escape route with separate ventilation system Contact tracing and seating data to identify exposed individuals Established protocols for communication Emergency numbers for appropriate organisations Communication through media/press conferences Access to laboratory for BWA analysis  Highly trained staff PPE Highly trained staff PPE Tested sampling methodologies Appropriate decontaminant methodology
High Easy access to building Ventilation inputs accessible from ground level No screening of mail or packages No trained security staff or biosensors No bioterror-specific alarm system Ventilation system without filters or air cleaners High degree of HVAC mixing Poor ventilation rate Building fully linked by single HVAC system No PPE, no designated escape route Escape requires moving through attacked zone No established communication protocols for dealing with bioattack Unclear communication/inconsistent advice   No access to appropriate lab facilities Untrained staff Inappropriate PPE Untrained staff Inappropriate PPE Inappropriate sampling methodologies Inappropriate decontamination techniques
Table 1: Examples of failure probabilities for the protection measures in the building vulnerability and resilience assessment.