

Decentralization by Devolution in Tanzania: Reflections on Water Service Delivery in the Selected Wards of Ilala Municipality, Dar es Salaam

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Abstract

Decentralization by devolution (D by D) is a driving force for service delivery, so if all elements of D by D complement each other the delivery of water service can be realized. This study examined decentralization by devolution in Tanzania: Reflections on water service delivery in selected wards of Ilala municipality.

The objective of the study was to examine the influence of D by D on water service delivery. The focus of the study was the variations between urban and peri-urban areas of Ilala Municipality. Existence of few empirical studies on the impact of D by D on water service delivery is the motivation for this study. The study adopted a descriptive comparative cross-sectional survey design that involved the use of questionnaires and interviews in collecting data from a sample of 384 respondents selected from a population of 64,579. The study also involved 9 key informants purposively selected from among the household and 5 purposively selected from local government officials and 3 purposively selected from central government officials so that to provide qualitative data to supplement the quantitative data obtained from questionnaires. Data was analyzed using frequencies, means, and standard deviation. The study revealed that the one aspect of D by D (fiscal aspect) has no influence on water service delivery and also coefficients revealed that by comparison, out of the three elements of decentralization by devolution, political decentralization explains a higher variance in water service delivery, followed by administrative decentralization. The study recommends that since D by D among other things aims at bringing services closer to the people, local officials should involve citizens in deciding matters affecting their livelihoods including planning and setting their priorities especially in water service delivery and there is need for water policy to state clearly how D by D works especially on water service delivery.

Keywords: Decentralization by Devolution (D by D); Administrative decentralization; Political decentralization; Fiscal decentralization

Introduction

Improving the delivery of public services such as water continues to be a key objective that has occupied the agenda of public administrators and researchers [1]. Historically the delivery of public services operated under centralized system whereby the central governments were in control of the delivery of all the public services including water. Due to the changes motivated by several factors like rapid increase in populations; limited budget in administration and development projects; the challenges in monitoring, evaluation and control of resource distribution; and the increase in tax bases and the central government failure to handle the budget of the local governments, the system of governance evolved from centralized to decentralized system. This shift was also the result of the constraints and failures of centralized service delivery especially at the local level, which made the governments to opt for the decentralized mechanisms of service delivery [2,3]. Consequently, the centralized government systems have been blamed for a long time for hindering efficient delivery of public services [4].

Decentralization in its various forms is now a common feature of reform in both developed and developing countries. It is taken as a political strategy for improving service delivery. Factors triggering the introduction of decentralization differ from one country to another. In some countries for example Pacific countries, decentralization resulted from demand of regional or local groups for increased local autonomy. After the introduction of decentralized system of governance, its performance made it to be recognized as an important theme of governance in both developed and developing societies of the world [5]. Decentralization is now widely regarded as a system of governance that ensures the delivery of social services such as education, health,

water, and sanitation to the public [6]. Basing on that fact, in the past two decades, there has been a renewed interest in decentralization, particularly in the context of developing countries seeking ways to promote accountability of government in public service delivery [7].

Despite the fact that decentralization system brought relief to the local communities in regards of public service delivery, an increased attention to water in decentralization is an issue and inadequate attention is being paid to effect of reform on the less advantaged populations' rural areas, small towns, and peri-urban areas. It is undeniable truth that water is life and yet not everyone has safe and secure access to this finite resource, for example; over 1.1 billion people worldwide lack access to safe drinking water [8]. According to UNICEF [9], apart from numerous investments made for thirty years since 1960s by 1990s millions of people globally were still without access to clean safe water. In 2008 it was estimated that 884 million people worldwide were living without access to clean and safe water while 205 billion people lacked adequate sanitation.

Decentralization as the system of governance has both pros and cons in its application worldwide. For instance in the United States of America the devolved water service operates under the federal water

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policy which is set through several important mechanisms, including congress and federal agencies. However, excessive nitrogen in particular is a major and growing problem contributing to impairment of waters throughout the Great Lakes and Mississippi River basins and hypoxia (low dissolved oxygen) in the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently, recently the Flint Water Advisory Task Force [10], reported that the current flint water crisis involves the government failure, intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice which resulted to the issues of unsafe water, contamination, and increased cases of Legionnaires' disease.

In Africa, some countries which have been decentralized include Kenya, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda [11]. In Nigeria for example, the responsibility for water supply is shared between three levels of government federal, state and local. The decentralized government is in charge of water resources management; state governments have the primary responsibility for urban water supply; and local governments together with communities are responsible for rural water supply. This framework helps the government to squeeze public services such as water service closer to the people but on the contrary water supply in Nigeria is characterized by low levels of accessibility [12].

Apart from Nigeria, the experience of Kenya shows that the three types of decentralization (political, fiscal, and administrative) were achieved at once with the ratification of the constitution [13]. Devolution of the water services function has assigned responsibility for water provision to democratically elect county governments that now face the challenge of being responsive to the needs of their electorates and to honor the constitutional obligation to progressively provide water services to all people. A part from that, devolution of water services in Kenya faces some challenges as stated by Odour [14] who reveal that water supply service delivery in the public sector in Kenya is largely affected by lack of integrity, low performance of water utilities and informal service providers.

In Tanzania specifically in Dar es Salaam, two public sector institutions are officially responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services. The Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) is the responsible and the owner of the city's water supply infrastructure. Meanwhile, the operational management of supply has been delegated to a public utility, Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Corporation (DAWASCO). This institutional framework is the outcome of a failed attempt at a full-fledged privatization of the city's water sector [15].

According to Kyessi [16], water service in Dar es Salaam city was extremely unreliable and characterized by extensive rationing and low pressures. Urban residents seek to access water through private and local initiatives. They secure water from myriad sources such as buying from door-to-door water resellers, fetching from neighbours with piped connections, fetching water from shallow open wells on boreholes and buying bottled mineral drinking water. Twaweza [17] observed that rich households withdraw from official water suppliers and resorted to private means such as getting water from private vendors.

EWURA [18], statistics revealed that in Dar es Salaam, 51% of the population is estimated to get water directly from the official public water supplier. Kassenga and Mbuligwe [19] found that provision of water service in Ilala municipality's peri-urban is 61.5% poor and 38.5% inadequate. While urban residents of Ilala Municipality who are connected to piped water suffers from water rationing and

electricity cutoff [20], peri-urban residents suffers from accessibility and affordability of water because they depend much on private water vendors and wells. The current statistics from the ministry of water and irrigation on water point status indicates that Ilala municipality has the total number of water point 633 in which functional are 438 and non functional are 195. So the total number of functional water points in Ilala (438) cannot satisfy the needs of 1,220,611 [21] people realistically.

This phenomenon has attracted a significant interest to the researcher to assess why even with the implementation of decentralization by devolution policy by the government and its agencies and partners such as DAWASCO in its areas, the impact of decentralization by devolution on water service delivery has not risen to an expected higher standard to facilitate the need of water to the population of Ilala municipality.

The influence of D by D on water service delivery

A number of studies have explored the influence of D by D on service delivery in various countries. In the following paragraphs, a study of Shah and Thompson [22] grouped these studies by their results positive, negative and inconclusive.

Positive influence: Estache and Sinha [23] using data on a cross-section of industrial and developing countries found that decentralization leads to increased spending on public infrastructure. Alderman [24] pointed out that decentralization had a positive influence on targeting of social assistance in Albania. Santos [25] discovered the same effect in Porto Alegre, Brazil with participatory budgeting. Isham and Kahkonen [26] observed improvements in water services in Central Java, Indonesia with local community management. King and Ozler [27] observed that decentralized management of schools led to improvement in achievement scores in Nicaragua. Huther and Shah [28] and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya [29] using cross-section and time series data for a large number of countries find that decentralization contributed to improved delivery of public goods provision.

The same results were confirmed by Galasso and Ravallion [30] for Bangladesh. Habibi et al. [31] studied the impact of devolution on social sector outcomes in Argentina for the period 1970-94 and concluded that fiscal decentralization had a positive influence on delivery of education and health services as well as reducing intra-regional disparities. Filmer and Eskeland [32] using a cross section data from Argentine schools also found that decentralization of education led to improvement in school achievement scores. Faguet [33] also found that decentralization in Bolivia helped improve consistency of public services with local preferences and quality and access of social services. Bardhan and Mookherjee [2] similarly find that decentralized management advanced poverty alleviation goals in West Bengal, India.

The negative influence: Winkler and Rounds [34] reviewed Chile's experience with education decentralization and concluded that it resulted in improvement in efficiency of provision but also experienced decline in score on cognitive tests. Ravallion [35] found that in Argentina, poorer provinces were less successful in favor of their poor areas and decentralization generated substantial inequality in public spending in poor areas. Also Azfar and Livingston [36] did not find any positive influence of decentralization on efficiency and equity of local public service provision in Uganda.

Inconclusive influence: Several studies observed mixed or inconclusive influence of decentralization. Azfar et al. [37] for Philippines and Uganda, concluded that while local governments

do appear to be aware of local preferences, their response is often inadequate as they are hamstrung by procedural, financing and governance constraints.

Materials and Methods

Study area and target population

This study was conducted in Ilala Municipality covering peri-urban and urban areas. Specifically the study was conducted in six selected wards in which three are from peri-urban and the other three are of urban. The wards in this study were Kitunda, Chanika, Pugu, Ilala, Buguruni, and Kariakoo. The study took a descriptive, comparative and cross-sectional survey design that involved use of quantitative and qualitative techniques to obtain the necessary and required information or data on decentralization by devolution in Tanzania: Reflections on water service delivery. The descriptive design was chosen because the study was concerned with systematic description householders' opinions on decentralization by devolution and water service delivery. Comparative study was chosen because the study intended to compare the level of water service delivery between urban and peri-urban areas of the selected wards of Ilala municipality. Cross-sectional research design was chosen because the data were collected from a sample of employees at a particular point in time.

The survey was chosen because the researcher intended to generalize the findings from a sample used to the whole population the households of the selected wards of Ilala municipality. Survey method was also opted for on account that several research studies on decentralization and water service delivery have used it successfully. The target population was Out of 26 wards of Ilala municipality with 300,660 households, the study target population consisted of only 64,579 households of the six selected wards. The six wards were purposively selected to represent both peri-urban and urban areas of Ilala municipality. The selected wards were; Kitunda, Chanika, Pugu, (purposively selected to represent peri-urban wards) and Ilala, Buguruni, and Kariakoo (purposively selected to represent urban wards).

Sampling

To attain the respective sample sizes, lists of households were obtained from each of the sampled ward to act as sampling frames. The study used a non probability sampling method called convenience sampling and a probability sampling method called systematic sampling. Convenience sampling was applied local officials who were selected from among the households basing on their willingness to participate in the study, while systematic sampling was employed to households. Purposive sampling was also used in which respondents from the ministry of water and irrigation were purposely selected for they were assumed to be confident and to posses more information about the decentralization by devolution.

Sample size

The entire population of Ilala municipality is affected by government systems and policies such as decentralization by devolution and in the same vein the population is entitled to public services such water. Basing on this fact, it is impossible to conduct research on all of them. Consequently, in view of circumstances like time and monetary costs the researcher obtained data from a sample of a population from purposively selected six wards with unique characteristics that differentiate them from peri-urban and urban areas. Regarding sample

size calculation, out of 11,123 households in Chanika ward, 11,815 households in Pugu ward, 13,060 households in Kitunda ward, 7,169 households in Ilala ward, 18,379 households in Buguruni ward, and 3,033 households in Kariakoo ward, samples of 66, 70, 78, 43, 109, and 18 were obtained respectively using Krejcie and Morgan [38] formula giving a total sample of 384 respondents (Tables 1 and 2).

Data analysis

To examine decentralization by devolution in Tanzania: reflections on water service delivery frequencies and percentages was used to analyze demographic characteristics of respondents, means and standard deviation were employed because the data collected was on Likert scale. According to Bonne and Bonne [39] means and standard deviation are the appropriate procedure in measuring central tendency and variability when analyzing Likert-scale data with the interest of combining items into a single composite score variable that represents the character.

To interpret the mean scores, values and interpretation mentioned in Table 3 were utilized.

Narrative analysis was used in interpreting findings from interviews to counter check the findings. Likert scales data collected using questionnaire and to provide a better understanding of the findings obtained from quantitative data.

Results and Discussion

The data was analyzed according to the objective, which was: To examine the influence of decentralization by devolution on water service delivery in Ilala Municipality.

Category of respondents (households)	Total population based on census (2012)	Sample size	Percentage (%)
Chanika ward	11,123	66	17.2
Pugu ward	11,815	70	18.2
Kitunda ward	13,060	78	20.2
Ilala ward	7,169	43	11
Buguruni ward	18,379	109	28.4
Kariakoo ward	3,033	18	5
Total	64,579	384	100

Table 1: Respondents of the study (Source: Primary data 2016).

Category of respondents (households)	Distributed questionnaires	Percentage (%)	Returned questionnaires	Percentage (%)
Chanika ward	66	17.2	55	14.3
Pugu ward	70	18.2	54	14
Kitunda ward	78	20.2	64	16.6
Ilala ward	43	11	41	11.1
Buguruni ward	109	28.4	105	27.3
Kariakoo ward	18	5	17	4.4
Total	384	100	336	87.7

Table 2: Response rate.

Mean range	Description	Interpretation
3.26-4.00	Strongly agree	Very high
2.51-3.25	Agree	High
1.76-2.50	Disagree	Low
1.00-1.75	Strongly disagree	Very low

Table 3: Value and interpretation.

Administrative aspect of D by D

Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics (i.e., means and standard deviations) on households rating ward officials on administrative power aspect of decentralization by devolution.

This is followed by findings obtained from analysis of qualitative data which were obtained using interview with ward officials that focused on the three constructs of the independent variable.

The mean scores in Table 4 indicate that most respondents rated ward officials high on three out of four items on administrative power with ward officials have power to implement decisions related to water services rating highest (mean=3.0744=high) followed by ward officials have power to control and monitor water services (mean=3.0655=high), then ward officials have power to plan on water services (mean=2.9315=high). However, some respondents rated ward officials low in terms of power to allocate financial resources for providing water services (mean=2.0268=low). Consequently, the average rating (mean=2.77455=high) implies that ward officials have administrative power that can be used to improve water service delivery. This means there is a high influence of decentralization by devolution (in administrative aspect) on water service delivery.

Interviews results on administrative aspect of decentralization by devolution

Households were asked whether their local government officials have power to plan, control and monitor water services, allocate financial resources and implement decisions related to water services.

Findings established that most households believe that local officials have administrative powers but they are not effectively applying on water service delivery and in some cases the centre still holds a lot of powers that end up dictating the decisions of the local government officials. One household explained “I am sure the law gives our local leaders those powers but they are just in writings. Their planning may apply in other aspects such as in organizing or planning on community security matters so people tend to respond because the issue of security is within themselves but plans on water in my ward I have never had a smell on such things from our leaders (HH1)”. This reflect households dissatisfaction on administrative aspect of decentralization by devolution in which its application is observed to be low as stated by the above household who believe that the application of administrative decentralization is difficult since those powers are only reflected in the policy but not applicable practically.

Another household explained that “the results of decentralization by devolution are vague, we may be getting good stories on how the government is trying to improve public service delivery by providing good environment for people to get employed and the like but when you think of these stories you will realize the same game applies in water services where the government will tell you that they have improved water service delivery but on the ground this is a wrong story very wrong! Just see for yourself how people line for water and probably the

last three will have to wait for water because the well has insufficient water (HH2)”. This implies that despite the fact that households rated local officials high on administrative powers but realistically those powers seems not to be helping households to get water service as explained by (HH2) who highlights issues like insufficiency of water.

On the other hand, the administrative aspect entails the structure that is involved in water service delivery. Findings established that the structure is weak and does not provide a good framework for water service delivery as one of the household explained “we expected to have water officers at street and ward level just like how we have education officers at ward levels, we cannot see the good administrative structure that stand as a framework for water service delivery, we really can’t just think of other services like health we can see dispensaries around or health centers and hospitals arranged in a way that we know when we need to get treatment we can start with the health centre and if it is critical we get transferred but that does not exist in water here because we do not see alternatives HH3).”

Local officials were asked whether they have power to plan, control and monitor water services, allocate financial resources and implement decisions related to water services.

Findings established that generally local officials have power to develop their own plans, control, and monitor and even develop budgets. Local leaders in a given locality (i.e., ward) have priorities for local service delivery and development projects are brought to the Mtaa (street) committees for discussion before being forwarded to the Ward Development Committee (WDC). Specifically in water service, these plans exist but its budget is always huge and hence the implementation becomes difficult. One local official (ward executive officer) explained that “the ward development committee works hand in hand with the councilor and they do the planning for the development of their specific wards and their people.

Planning, controlling and monitoring are all part and parcel of local officials’ responsibilities what you have seen around is our doings; we develop plans and implement them! But not all of us some of us are lazy and they take things for granted!” (KT1).

Another ward official explained that “we have ward committees and even at street level we still have committees responsible for ensuring development it is very open even here in my ward the development committee receive a lot of ideas and suggestions from street representatives in regards to water during my past eight years I was able to construct 2 wells under my supervision in conjunction with our community water organization, so we try do remarkable things my friend but the situation dictates and I believe if we continue to run our things the way we are used the problem of water will always be there” he continued explaining “in my position I am supposed to implement the decisions made by our council but in some cases implementation becomes difficult than monitoring trust me water projects needs a lot of money and that makes hard for many water projects to succeed close supervision and monitoring in water aspect in most cases

Item	Mean	Std. deviation	Interpretation
Ward officials have power to implement decisions related to water services	3.0744	0.37512	High
Ward officials have power to control and monitor water services	3.0655	0.38073	High
Ward officials have power to plan on water services	2.9315	0.46817	High
Ward officials allocate financial resources for providing water services	2.0268	0.34881	Low
Total	2.77455	0.393208	High

Table 4: Administrative power (n=336) Source: Primary data 2016.

the community owned water organizations helps a lot as they make community members feel ownership of their projects such as wells constructed under their watch and involvement” (PG1).

On the other hand another local official explained that “despite the fact the we do the planning, still we do not have reliable sources of funds, so we make paper plans and stay waiting for the national budget to release money from the line ministries to the local governments and downwards to the district councils where from that level it goes up to the wards where we start effecting national programs/projects priorities this may result to the ward failure to even consider their own priorities and hence allocation of financial resources to water service delivery is impossible” (CH1). This implies devolved administrative powers are not more practical in some cases.

Central government officials were asked whether administrative aspect of decentralization is fully devolved and has an influence in water service delivery

The findings revealed the administrative aspect of decentralization is devolved and has influence on water service delivery in peri-urban areas as one of the official explained “devolution works more in rural areas and peri-urban areas but not more in urban areas the devolved administrative powers gives local government power to make decisions related to water services. For example; previously local government officials did not have such powers because all decisions related to public service provision were centrally managed and local officials only implemented the decisions from the centre the changes brought by the introduction of the first water policy of 1991 and the current water policy of 2002 expanded the powers of local officials and presently they can decide on water services such as on expansion of water points (community wells) and even propose other water projects and request for the funding from the central government” (M1). This implies that administrative aspect of devolution is not fully devolved as stated by the M1 and this affect the entire policy on devolving water service.

Another official explained “today local officials can freely coordinate water projects within their areas of jurisdiction they can also involve their residents on getting ideas on what they need to do in order to improve water services in some areas local officials get support from private companies and even international organizations to run their water projects so those who develop projects can get luck sometimes” (M2). This means that even though local officials can coordinate or plan on water, still their efforts can go in vain as the funding is on the mercy of other stakeholders or development partners who can either provide or not provide the funding.

Political aspect of D by D

Findings on political power are presented in Table 5. The mean score indicates that most respondents rated ward officials high on one out of four items on political power with ward officials involves citizens in decision making regarding water service delivery rating highest (mean=3.4345=very high) followed by ward officials make decisions on water service delivery (mean=3.2589=high), then ward officials have

clear policy on water service delivery (mean=3.1190=high). However, some respondents rated ward officials low in having mandate to legislate on water service delivery at local level (mean=1.9732=low). Consequently, the rating average of (mean=2.9464=high) implies that ward officials have high political power that can be used to improve water service delivery. This means there is a high influence of decentralization by devolution (political aspect) on water service delivery.

Interviews results on political aspect of decentralization by devolution

Households were asked whether local officials involve citizens in decision making, have clear policy guidelines on water service delivery, power to make decisions on water service delivery, and power to make by-laws.

Findings established that despite the high rating of local officials on involving citizens in decision making, in most cases the involvement does not touch issues related to water but security, health and in most cases education. A part from that on having clear policy guidelines on water service delivery, local officials seem not to be concerned with the challenges of water service. Regarding power to make decisions on water service delivery, their decisions are not productive because they base on plans that never get implemented for years. And on power to make by-laws, they make several by-laws but they consider citizens approval on such by-laws during meetings. One of the household explained “we always have meetings so many times and they are becoming a boredom we get involved in several issues and we share our views and arrive at a decision I have never contributed to water issues and I have been here for only 11 months and all the attended meetings not even a single meeting talked of water despite the fact that the we suffer from access to water (HH4)”. So this implies that involvement of citizens in decision making is done but the decisions do not take water service delivery as a priority or the issue that require attention.

The findings further established that when citizen tend to rise water issues during meetings are told to struggle themselves because the government does not have enough budget as another household explained “we are really involved in decision making even last week we had a street meeting on deciding how to deal with persisting robbery in water services I remember my neighbor once raised and people talked a lot about the challenges we face here I remember one local government official said for them to solve water challenges is impossible and he just encouraged people to struggle themselves by working hard so that they can be able to buy or construct their own water wells (HH5)”. This shows that despite the fact that citizens are involved in decision making, still that involvement does not yield positive results on issues related to water service delivery as explained by (HH5).

Another household explained “I believe they cannot be in offices without knowing what to do they have clear policy guidelines on water but they seem not to be concerned with the challenges we face here on water (HH6)”. This implies that citizens believe that their leaders (local

Item	Mean	Std. deviation	Interpretation
Ward officials involves citizens in decision making regarding water service delivery	3.4345	0.56399	Very high
Ward officials make decisions on water service delivery	3.2589	0.52539	High
Ward officials have clear policy guidelines on water service delivery	3.1190	0.58651	High
Ward officials are mandated to make by-laws on water service delivery at local level	1.9732	0.62952	Low
Total	2.9464	0.576353	High

Table 5: Political power (n=336) Source: Primary data 2016.

government officials) know about water policy but they deliberately fail to work on challenges regarding water. Another household explained “I sincerely do not know if that involvement is there and I know nothing about them making decisions regarding water service delivery what I know is that this is a very busy place, everyone is struggling with life and no time to waste is meetings I personally have use DAWASCO water and sometimes from private vendors (HH7)”. This shows that some residents have no information on matters pertaining to their own life such as water; they are not attending meetings to share their own views and have a contribution to community development and the nation at large.

Also another household explained “they do make decisions on water service but their decisions are not productive because they base on ideal plans just like dreams never get implemented for years! On making by-laws they do during community meeting and in cases of water we have some laws on the use and misuse of community wells (HH8)”. This implies that by-laws on water service exist.

On the other hand local officials were asked whether they involve citizens in decision making, have clear policy guidelines on water service delivery, have power to make decisions on water service delivery, and power to make by-laws.

Findings established that the policy on water is not developed by local government authorities but they all follow and use national policy on water at the same time they have power to develop several by-laws regarding water usage such as in areas with water points or community well, water committees formed from among the community members monitors water services in their respective wards. The first local official explained “the policy on water we are using is the national water policy of 2002 but the truth is I personally do not know it clearly in my ward we have community wells that were constructed under the government water projects in early 2000s but they are not enough we have only 2 the good thing citizens have authority over control, monitoring and even decide price of water through water committee (PG2).” This means that the by-laws are developed by the community members with their local leaders for the purpose of protecting their community wells.

The second local official explained “the by-laws are developed every now and then because we cannot depend on the general water policy, so we develop them to guide us on the protection of our community wells and we also put some fines in case one goes beyond our agreement the government insists on community water management because previously people used to destroy water infrastructures so currently the state of ownership is with them...we have few water wells constructed by the government but few are too old and if you go in the next ward you may find two that are completely closed they are not working (KT2).” This also implies that the by-laws exists and at the same time the issue of having old infrastructures on water is revealed in which having water points that are not working is an indicator that there is a problem.

Central government officials were also asked whether political aspect of decentralization is fully devolved and has an influence in water service delivery.

The findings established that political aspect of decentralization by devolution has an influence on water service delivery as one official explained “According to the Tanzania water policy, local government authorities like municipal councils and ward councils are responsible for the provision and monitoring of water and sanitation services. The role of these municipal councils differs between rural and urban populations In Dar es Salaam, areas that are served by piped water networks have less direct interactions with municipal councils. Instead, day-to-day interactions take place between water users and the water utility company. So this means that water users directly forward their complaints to the water utility company officers and in cases involving peri-urban areas the local leaders get to know what their residents want and use their development committee to communicate or plan how to solve any existing problem” (M3). This implies that there is a direct influence of political aspect of D by D on water service delivery as explained by (M3) above.

On the other hand, another official explained “a close relationship between municipal councils and water users is very apparent. Municipal councils are responsible for construction of water wells and monitoring of the water committees particularly on performance on service delivery and financial management. Municipal councils are also responsible for registering community owned water supply organizations (COWSOs).

Water committees are required to report to the municipal councils on monthly basis using paper based reporting tools. However, quick and day-to-day communications are often done through calling personal mobile phones” (M2). This implies that the political aspect of D by D has an influence on water service delivery because the interaction and interrelationship between the councils and COWSOs makes the devolved political powers realistic.

Fiscal aspect of D by D

Findings on fiscal power are presented in Table 6. The mean scores indicate that few respondents rated ward officials high on two out of three items on fiscal power with ward officials are mandated to spend revenue obtained from the central government to provide water services rating high (mean=2.9196=high). However, most respondents rated ward officials low on two out of three items on fiscal power with ward officials collect user charges from those utilizing water services delivered to the community (mean=1.7708=low) followed by ward officials have power to generate revenue (mean=1.7589=very low).

Consequently, the rating average of (mean=2.149767=low) implies that ward officials have low fiscal power in water service delivery. This means there is a no significant influence of decentralization by devolution (fiscal aspect) on water service delivery.

The combination of administrative, political and fiscal constructs of decentralization by devolution makes the average mean of 2.623572 which is interpreted as high and hence, the results of the findings indicates that there is a significant influence of decentralization by devolution on water service delivery.

Item	Mean	Std. deviation	Interpretation
Ward officials are mandated to spend revenue obtained from the central government to provide water services	2.9196	0.40456	High
Ward officials collect user charges from those utilizing water services delivered to the community	1.7708	0.44169	Low
Ward officials have power to generate revenue	1.7589	0.55037	Very low
	2.149767		Low

Table 6: Fiscal power (n=336) Source: Primary data 2016.

Interviews results on fiscal aspect of decentralization by devolution

Households were asked whether local officials have power to generate revenue, mandate to spend revenue obtained from the central government and collect user charges from those utilizing water services delivered to the community.

Findings established that power to generate revenue is not seen as in many cases no revenue is generated by local officials specifically on water. On mandate to spend revenue obtained from the central government, the findings established that citizens are not given updates on the spending. And on collection of user charges from those utilizing water services, the findings established that there is no collection of user charges from the local government but community owned water supply organizations do collect as one of the household explained “we do not have resources to use on water services and we also do not have sources of generating revenue I once happened to be a street chairperson so I know what is going on yes by the law we have powers to generate revenue but realistically we have no sources! the ward development committee only wait for a small share dropped from above and spend it even though it is always not even close to the required budget” (HH8). This implies that local government is not fully independent and autonomous and the fiscal devolved powers have no positive influence on water service delivery.

Another household explained “I have never attended any meeting so I have no idea whether the resources exist but what I am sure of is that our ward officials have nothing! If you go to street level it's even worse they are like baggers! So how can we say that they generate revenue? This is a simple puzzle, if they do why can't they pay themselves first? There is no generation of revenue! No collection of user charges! (HH9)”. This implies that fiscal aspect of D by D does not work properly due to the fact that there are no fiscal resources in wards and local officials cannot generate revenue due to the lack of revenue sources.

Local officials were asked whether they have power to generate revenue, mandate to spend revenue obtained from the central government and collect user charges from those utilizing water services delivered to the community

Findings established that local officials have power to generate revenue and can spend revenue obtained from the central government even though practically the collection of revenue depend on the sources of revenue found in a particular locality. But the collection of user charges from those utilizing water services delivered to the community is not excised by the local officials. One of the local official explained “here we just wait for our share from the district council and it is from that share where we spend basing on our priorities (LG4)”. And another also explained “our budget is always cut after getting the share so our spending also is limited by the share the fact is we have a lot of challenges in water sector that even the central government have intervened and it is still working just like presently with the water sector development program but still the challenges are persisting all over the country we keep trying but solving all the challenges with our insufficient budgets will not be possible (LG5)”. This shows that the fiscal aspect of D by D is difficult to be implementing in a give situation as explained by both (LG4 and LG5) above.

The general findings on objective one (the influence of D by D on water service delivery) indicates that there is a partial influence of D by D on water service delivery in which administrative and political

aspects of D by D have influence on water service delivery while fiscal aspect has no influence on water service delivery. These findings are contrary to soufflé theory of decentralization in the sense that the given aspects of D by D could not complement each other and hence lack of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of water services in both urban and peri-urban wards of Ilala Municipality.

Conclusions

The study concludes that there is a need for the government to make review on the implementation of decentralization by devolution policy especially on water service delivery basing on the findings of the study, the three elements of D by D do not complement each other and for D by D to produce positive results the review must be done to enable local government authorities exercise full authority over the delivery of services such as water to their local communities. It is by so doing, the influence of decentralization by devolution on water service delivery can be completely significant. For instance; the implementation of D by D policy was expected to produce strong and stable local administrative structure at the ward and Mtaa (sub-ward) level but presently Mtaa and Ward institutions are not directly involved in water supply activities, while in a real sense they are critical players. This in particular refers to the potential role they may play in regulating and supporting the quality control activities, including the protection of water sources and identification of potential challenges involved in water. Councilors at the Ward and Mtaa level are also instrumental in mobilization and advocacy matters that concern water challenges.

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