Overwork and Adverse Effects on Health

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Abstract

The Japanese Government reports that the health of Japanese employees deteriorated in the 1990s - 2000s during the Japanese recession. This paper examines the relationship between overtime work and health of employees. We present a theoretical model showing that overtime work causes an individual’s health to deteriorate. This is based on the hypothesis that overtime work is implicitly built into a firm’s promotion system. Using the data of 6,985 individuals from the first National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98) provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, our empirical results support our hypothesis and show strong associations among overtime work, health and socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as well as labor market conditions.

Keywords: Overtime work; Health; Promotion

Introduction

Overtime work is prevalent in the Japanese labor market [1,2]. A survey made by the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO, in Japanese) in 2002 shows that the average of paid overtime work hours in the month in June 2002 was 21 hours per union member. Furthermore, the average unpaid overtime work hours in 2002 were 8.7 hours. On the other hand, Japanese government statistics report rather low overtime work hours; the highest monthly-average paid overtime work hours per person in 2013 are 14.3 hours in firms with over 500 regular employees; the lowest are 7.0 hours in firms with 5-29 regular employees. Regardless of low or high reported statistics of overtime work hours, the distribution of overtime work among employees is not uniform in the Japanese labor market.

Concerning the health of Japanese employees, total mental illness applications rose abruptly from 1998 to 2001. There was also a dramatic increase in the number of suicides in the late 1990s. The number of recognition of total physical illness, including brain blood vessel disease and ischemic heart disease, etc, showed increasing trends in the 1990s, when Japan experienced severe economic recession².

The Adverse effects of overwork on an employee’s health, especially sudden death from overwork, have become a hotly debated social issue. Sudden death due to cardiovascular and cerebro vascular disease seems to be caused by high job strain [3]. The aforementioned RENGO survey indicates union workers become more anxious about their health as they work more hours beyond contractual hours [5-7]. In addition, according to the First National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98: the sample size N = 6,985) made by the Japan Society of Family Sociology, less healthy people work fewer hours than those in better health see Tables 1 and 2 [4].

Why do employees accept overwork in their workplace, while the epidemiological relationship between overwork and its adverse effects on health cannot be ignored? [1,2] Provide one answer for the behavior of longer work hours by US male and female managers: people in a higher job status with more responsibility seek the higher monetary rewards from long hours as well as experiencing peer pressure and seeking an emotional respite from home. In fact, their US study reports work stress is associated with longer work hours among male managers, as the above RENGO survey shows with Japanese union workers.

The purpose of this study is twofold: first, we provide a theoretical model to explain why Japanese employees choose excessive paid-and unpaid-overtime work despite its adverse effects on their health. Second, we empirically test if an individual’s health improves during a recession with Japanese data, as with US data by [5,6], since an abrupt increase in the number of health problems with Japanese employees.

 hypothesis that overtime work is implicitly built into a firm’s promotion system. Using the data of 6,985 individuals from the first National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98) provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, our empirical results support our hypothesis and show strong associations among overtime work, health and socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as well as labor market conditions.

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A Theoretical Model of Overtime Work and Health of Employee

The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical model to explain why overtime work is prevalent among regular employees in Japan. There are at least three reasons why employees are willing to work overtime.

First, we consider the employee’s incentive to work overtime as a signal of the individual’s commitment to the firm where they work. Employees know their paid- and unpaid-overtime work incentives are intrinsically built into a job promotion system in the firm. Therefore, overtime work has another aspect reflecting the employee’s lack of competency in their job. That is, a typical employee can mask his or her lack of competency to some degree by showing their commitment to the firm through overtime work. Third, since the parameter reflecting the firm’s evaluation on employee’s incentive for overtime work is not clearly specified in the labor contract between the firm and the employees, a risk adverse attitude leads a typical employee to work overtime. In a typical case, by misinterpreting the parameter the employee commits excessive overtime work, which eventually causes deterioration in health.

In our theoretical model, we assume a typical employee maximizes his or her discounted expected utility of income in two periods \( t = 0 \) and \( t = 1 \), as follows:

\[
E[U(Y)] = P(H_0)U(Y_0) + P(H_1)\rho U(Y_1),
\]

Where \( H_i \) is the health stock of a typical employee at time \( t \):
a larger value of $H$ implies better health of the individual; $P(H_i)$ is the probability reflecting the individual’s health condition, 
\[
\frac{\partial P(H_i)}{\partial H_i} \equiv P_{H_i} > 0 ; \quad Y_i \text{ is his income from labor; and} \\
0 < \rho < 1 \text{ is a discount factor. Of equation (1), we assume } U(Y_i) \text{ takes a form of } \ln Y_i \text{ for our operational purpose.}
\]

The employee chooses optimal hours of overtime work per period to maximize his discounted expected utility of income, while his time constraint is given as,
\[
\Omega = L_t + T_t = \bar{L} + \Delta L + T_t, \quad t = 0,1 .
\]

Where $\Omega$ a total amount of hours per period is, e.g., 24 hours a day; $L_t$ represents work hours in period $t$, consisting of contractual work $L_t$ and overtime work hours $\Delta L_t$; and $T_t$ represents total leisure hours in period $t$.

Here, we assume that employee’s overtime work in period 0 is intrinsically built into the individual’s promotion in the firm and his promotion takes place in the second period, $t = 1$. The promotion scheme is given as follows:
\[
P_{pro} = \frac{(L_0 - \bar{L})^\beta}{\bar{L}} = \frac{\Delta L^\beta}{\bar{L}} < 1 , \quad \beta > 0 .
\]

Where $P_{pro}$ the promotion is rate; and $\beta$ represents the parameter by which the firm evaluates an employee’s overtime work, which is not explicitly expressed in the labor contract between the firm and employees. If the employee wants to be promoted and,

Consequently, has higher labor earnings at $t = 1$, he chooses overtime work, $\Delta L_0 = \bar{L} > 0$, and his promotion rate next period is positive, $0 < P_{pro} < 1$. On the other hand, if the employee chooses to work the contractual hours $L_0 = \bar{L}$ at $t = 0$, then the firm will not promote him next period such that $P_{pro} = 0$ and pays the same wage rate at $t = 1$ as $\bar{W}$ paid by contract at $t = 0$. Here, we assume that the firm does not have enough information on the employee’s aptitude for the job and, therefore, offers the same wage rate $\bar{W}$ to every employee at $t = 0$ and requests the contractual labor hours, $\bar{L}$ per period. The wages at $t = 0$ are $\bar{W} \cdot \bar{L}$ for every employee in the firm.

On the other hand, if the employee chooses to work overtime so that $P_{pro} > 0$, his income at $t = 1$ is $(1 + P_{pro})\bar{W} \cdot \bar{L}$, where $L_t$ represents his work hours at $t = 1$. The employee, however, faces some probability of being laid off by the firm in each period due to changes in labor market conditions, for which the market unemployment rate is proxy. Hence, the income for the employee at $t = 0$ is $Y_0 = (1 - \phi u_0)\bar{W} \bar{L}$ and the income at $t = 1$ is, where $u_t$ is the market unemployment rate in period $t$ and $0 < \phi < 1$ is an employment adjustment factor in the firm in response to $u_t$. $\phi$ is assumed to be a function of $u_t$ and the firm’s policy is to adjust the employee’s overtime work in response to changes in the market unemployment rate. That is, when the market unemployment rate is high, the firm is more willing to cut employees’ overtime work such that $\frac{\partial \phi(u_t)}{\partial u_t} = \phi_t < 0$.

Finally, we also take into consideration that the employee’s health is affected by his health capital, whose value at $t = 0$ is determined by the amount of hours invested in his health production as,
\[
H_0 = AT_0^{\alpha_1}.
\]

Where $H_0$ is the health capital of the employee at $t = 0$; $A > 0$ is his inherited stock of health; and $0 < \alpha < 0$ is the parameter reflecting the efficiency of his health production and potential ability, e.g., his productivity in the firm. In the second period, the health capital of the employee is given by $H_1 = I_1 + (1 - \delta)H_0$, where $I_1$ is his health investment at $t = 1$, which is assumed $\frac{\partial I_1}{\partial H_0} = 0$ for brevity; and $0 < \delta < 1$ is a health depreciation rate of the employee. We assume the stock of the health of the employee in each period affects the probability of being in good health, $P(H_1)$.

The probability of good health in each period is assumed to influence the level of utility derived from consumption by the employee in each period, $C_t, t = 0,1$. Since here we assume there is one type of good with the price in unity, the amount of consumption at time $t$ equals the income made by the employee at time $t$, such that $C_t = Y_t$.

Now, we assume that the employee maximizes his discounted expected utility of income, as defined in equation (1), with respect to his overtime work $\Delta L$ and we have:
\[
\Delta L = \frac{\rho \beta P_{pro} P(H_1) Y_0}{\alpha H_0 \Pi_t} .
\]
Where \( \dot{P}_{prog} = \frac{P_{prog}}{1 - P_{prog}} > 0 \); and
\[
\Pi = \Pi_0 + \Pi_1 = P_{T_0} \ln Y_0 + \rho (1 - \delta) P_{T_1} \ln Y_1 > 0 \quad \text{of}
\]
which \( \Pi_0 = P_{T_0} \ln Y_0 > 0 \) and \( \Pi_1 = \rho (1 - \delta) P_{T_1} \ln Y_1 > 0 \).

Of equation (5), since we define \( L_0 = \overline{L} \) when \( \Delta L = 0 \)
and \( L_0 = \overline{L} + \Delta L \) when \( \Delta L > 0 \), if \( 0 < \Delta L < T_0 \), then
\( 0 < \rho \beta \dot{P}_{prog} P(H_i) < \alpha H_i \Pi \).

Now, first we evaluate the effects on the health of a typical employee \( H_0 \) who works overtime \( \Delta L \) at \( I = 0 \).17 The health effect is as follows:}

\[
\frac{d \ln \Delta L}{d \ln H_0} = \frac{T_0}{\overline{T}} (\Psi - 1) \geq 0 ,
\]

where \( \Psi = \frac{1 - \delta H_i}{\overline{H}_i} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1}}{(1 - \delta) \overline{H}_i \Pi} \right) > 1 \) and \( \sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1} = P_{T_0} H_i P(H_i) > 0 \) which we call the elasticity of

With respect to the effect of promotion on overtime work, it is clear from equation (5) that \( \frac{d \ln \Delta L}{d \ln P_{prog}} > 0 \). Thus, if overtime work by employees is built into the system of promotion in the firm, the individual employee has an incentive to work overtime, which leads to a higher job status and consequently raises his wages next period21. Certainly, the employee’s incentive to work overtime is influenced by parameter \( \beta \) in equation (3), whose value is set by the firm22. Therefore, the amount of overtime work by employees can be manipulated when there is asymmetric information on \( \beta \) between the firm and employees.

Now, we will examine if a typical employee who is more efficient in producing good health tends to work overtime or not. We use \( \alpha \) in equation (4) as a proxy for the employee’s efficiency in the health production. The efficiency effect is negative as:

\[
\frac{d \ln \Delta L}{d \ln \alpha} = \frac{T_0}{\overline{T}} \left[ \frac{1 + \alpha \ln T_0 + \alpha \ln T_1}{\Pi} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1}}{(1 - \delta) \sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1}} \right) \right] < 0 ,
\]

As
\[
0 < \lambda = \frac{H_0}{H_i} < 1.23
\]

If years of schooling are considered a proxy for employee’s efficiency not only in his health production but also for his job aptitude in the firm, an individual with more schooling years is less likely to work overtime than a counterpart with less schooling.

Also, the effect of current income \( Y_0 \), on overtime work is negative. Through the negative income effect, an employee with higher household income will have less overtime work per period than one with lower income. In addition, the effect of health capital depreciation \( \delta \) on overtime work depends on the values of both elasticity’s of health probability \( \eta_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1} > 0 \) and of marginal health probability \( \sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1} < 0 \). The effect is negative as long as

\[
\frac{\Pi_1}{(1 - \delta) \Pi} < \lambda \left( \frac{\eta_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1}}{\sigma_{\Pi \Delta \Pi_0 \Pi_1}} \right). \quad \text{If} \ \delta \ \text{is positively correlated with age of employee, then employees tend to work less overtime as they have a job tenure.}
\]

Finally, we evaluate how labor market conditions affect overtime work of employees. When the market unemployment rate is high, the employee will probably be more willing to work overtime since his job security is unstable. In addition, similar to the Japanese recession, employees who keep their jobs, when their colleagues are laid off are forced to work overtime in order to take over the left tasks. Hence, an increase in layoffs in the firm will have a positive effect on overtime work in the short run.

On the other hand, the decision on overtime work by employees during a recession may not be always made solely by the employee, but may be decided in cooperation with the firm. When a recession in the economy becomes prolonged, the firm needs to reduce the overtime work of employees, which is accounted for by altering the value of the employment adjustment factor, where \( 0 < \phi < 1 \) and \( \frac{d \phi}{d u_i} < 0 \). Therefore, the net
The first term inside the parenthesis of (8) does not take into consideration the effect of unemployment on the employee’s health. The studies [5-7] indicate that the price of this input falls in a recession (Grossman 2004).

The result of equation (8) does not take into consideration the effect of unemployment on the employee’s health. The studies [5-7] indicate that the price of this input falls in a recession (Grossman 2004).

Therefore, the total effect of unemployment on employee overtime work depends on the net effect of the above positive or negative short-run effect and the long-run health effect as,

\[
\frac{d \ln \Delta L}{d \ln u_0} = \frac{P_{u0} \varphi u_0}{(1 - \varphi u_0)} \left(1 + \epsilon_\varphi\right) \leq 0, \tag{9}
\]

where \(\epsilon_\varphi = \frac{d \varphi}{du_0} u_0 < 0\), which is the firm's employment adjustment elasticity. In equation (8), the sign is negative if the absolute value of the adjustment elasticity is greater than one, \(|\epsilon_\varphi| > 1\).

The derivation of equation (9) is available upon request.
We calculate overtime work (owh) by using total working hours per month (twh) minus average contractual working hours per month in prefecture in 1998 (awh). Of all aged 28-64 in Table 4, we first tested if the health index variable (GHQ) and years of schooling (eduyr) are endogenous to overtime work (owh) of individuals. The Tobit result for an endogeneity test for GHQ and eduyr in the owh regression shows the estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on the eghat variable (the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of GHQ) is 10.867 (t = 5.61) and the estimated coefficient on the eduyr variable (the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of eduyr) is 6.717 (t = 4.26), indicating both GHQ and eduyr are endogenous to overtime work [10,11].

Specifically, the first-stage reduced form equations of GHQ and eduyr include IVs (health, speduyr and pjobtype, i.e., pjobtype0 to pjobtype45) in addition to the exogenous variables listed for unemp98 in city3 in Table 3. The first-stage F-values of the GHQ and eduyr regressions are 20.39 and 45.94, respectively, showing the high instrument relevance. And the over identifying restriction tests of IVs (health, speduyr and pjobtype) of GHQ and eduyr show IVs are significant at 10%.

### Results for overtime work regressions: all aged 28-64

Of all aged 28-64 in Table 4, we first tested if the health index variable (GHQ) and years of schooling (eduyr) are endogenous to overtime work (owh) of individuals. The Tobit result for an endogeneity test for GHQ and eduyr in the owh regression shows the estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on the eghat variable (the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of GHQ) is 10.867 (t = 5.61) and the estimated coefficient on the eduyr variable (the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of eduyr) is 6.717 (t = 4.26), indicating both GHQ and eduyr are endogenous to overtime work [10,11].

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>2SLS (Age: 28 – 39)</th>
<th>2SLS (Age: 40 – 49)</th>
<th>2SLS (Age: 50 – 64)</th>
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<tr>
<td>GHQhat</td>
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<td>-11.648 (-1.83)</td>
<td>-29.937 (-4.74)</td>
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<td>eduyrhat</td>
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### Empirical Results

The empirical regression results of overtime work and GHQ (General Health Questionnaire: health index) for all individuals age 28 through 64 are reported in Table 4. The overtime work regression results for individuals grouped into three categories by age (28-39, 40-49, and 50-64) are reported in Table 5. The GHQ health index variable follows the studies by [8,9] and takes values from 0 to 16. The value of GHQ=16 indicates the individual is in very poor health. To avoid sample bias due to observations for individuals who report 0 working hours per month, we use Tobit regression censored variable by variable26.

### Table 4: Regression Results (Age: 28 – 64).

The variables used in this study and their definitions and statistics are reported in Table 3. There are no observations on individuals under 28 years old.

### Table 5: Regression Results by Different Age Groups.
exogenous to owh and twh. [12], since the F-value for over-identifying restriction is 0.30 and the χ²
value is the J-test=1.8 (i.e., mF = 6 × 0.3 ), which is smaller than χ²k−k = 7.78 at a 10% significance level27.

The 2SLS (1) regression result of owh (overtime work) in Table 4 shows the estimated coefficient of GHQ is -20.859 (t = -5.27), which is statistically significant at a 1 percent significance level. Employees reporting more health problems are less likely to have overtime work. This result is also the same when we use the variable of individual’s total hours of work per month (twh) under 2SLS (2)28. Therefore, it is clear that individuals with better health work more overtime. The coefficient of education years (eduryr) is statistically negative as theoretically predicted. That is, more efficient employees work less overtime.

Of the estimated coefficients under 2SLS (1), the variable of unemp98 (unemployment rate), reflecting labor market conditions in 1998 (when the survey data were collected), is statistically significant and negative. We show in Section III that whether an increase in the unemployment rate lowers overtime work of employees in the short run depends on the value of the firm’s employment adjustment elasticity Eφ in Equation (8). Our empirical negative effect of unemp98 seems to indicate that the adjustment elasticity Eφ is greater than one in absolute value. Put differently, Japanese firms seem to adjust their production of output by quickly controlling overtime work of employees as a strategy in response to changes in market conditions in the short run. On the other hand, if we take the long-run health effect via unemployment on overtime work into consideration see Equation (9), the overall marginal unemployment effect on overtime work is about 2.86, which is less than half of the short-run unemployment effect29. In terms of the elasticity of overtime work with respect to the unemployment rate, the short-run elasticity is about 0.56, while the long-run elasticity is about 0.2430. Therefore, firms will choose to layoff rather than adjusting overtime work of employees in response to long-run market demand for their products.

The variables of current job (pjobcon#) and firm sizes (compsize) are included in the regression to control characteristics of firms31. Except the low-skilled work (pjobcon5), professionals (pjobcon1), administrators (pjobcon2), employees in charge of office work (pjobcon3), sales (pjobcon4) are more likely to work overtime. This is also the case in a US study by [1,2] who found that employees with higher job status and more responsibility, e.g., managers, tend to choose more overtime work.

Most of the socio-economic individual characteristics studied here are significantly associated with overtime work of employees. An increase in spousal income (spincome) lowers overtime work. Negative effects are also found for employees who care for the elderly at home (caredm), and are married (marrymd), whereas positive effects are with household head (hheaddm) and male work overtime (gender)32. From these results, we find that socio-economic factors which hinder promotions have negative effects on overtime work33.

Results for the GHQ health index regression

Of the GHQ (Tobi) regression in the last column in Table 4, although not reported in the table, the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of overtime work (owh) are not statistically significant in explaining the GHQ health index, indicating that overtime work of employees is not endogenous to their health34. We, therefore, report only the regression results of the GHQ Tobi model in Table 4, in which the estimated coefficient of overtime work (owh) is 0.030 (t = 31.87)35. Of the relationship between overtime work and health of employees, we consider that an increase in exogenous overtime work of employees deteriorates their health first and then the poor health condition of employees consequently reduces overtime work of employees.

The estimated coefficient for the unemployment rate (unemp98) is -0.178 (t = -3.21), the negative sign is congruent with the previous studies [5-7]. The effect of years of education completed (eduryr) is also negative on GHQ, implying efficient individuals are more likely to be in good health, ceteris paribus. For the other socio-economic characteristics in the GHQ regression, the estimated coefficients of income of spouse (spincome), and married (marrymd) are significantly negative. This show that good health is associated with these characteristics.

Results for overtime work regressions: employees aged 28-39, 40-49, and 50-64

In Table 5, the estimated coefficient of the GHQ health index variable is statistically significant for employees aged 40-49 and 50-64, but not for those aged 28-39. Since the signs of the estimated coefficients are all negative, employees with better health are more likely to work overtime; however, this relationship is more prevalent amongst older employees. On the other hand, changes in labor market conditions influence overtime work of relatively younger employees, indicating that firms are likely to have younger employees work overtime in response to labor market conditions, i.e., fluctuations of market demand for their products.

The variable of current job (pjobcon#) has a predominantly significant effect on their overtime work among employees aged 40-49 and 50-64. Therefore, we can expect there to be more health problems with these age groups due to excessive overtime work. Among the
socio-economic characteristics of individuals, younger employees with higher spouse-income (spincome) work less overtime, whereas household heads (hheaddm) and males (gender) work more overtime.

In sum, most of our findings support the hypothesis. First, that overtime work of employees is built into the system of job promotion and, therefore, overtime work among Japanese employees is prevalent and has the adverse effects on their health. Second, employees with good health tend to work overtime, but excessive overtime work is likely to result in the deterioration of their health, which consequently lowers their overtime work.

Third, overtime work of employees is strongly cyclical – falling during an economic recession, which indirectly supports the evidence from US studies that health improves in a recession, since overtime work of employees deteriorates their health. Fourth, of the various socio-demographic characteristics of individuals analyzed in this study, other factors deter employees from job promotions, such as, caring for the elderly in the household and being female, cause less overtime work of employees. Finally, years of schooling have a strong negative effect on overtime work. This indicates that more efficient employees are less likely to do overtime work, ceteris paribus.

Summary and Conclusion

Japan is on the list of high longevity countries. However, a large number of health problems were reported during the 1990s and 2000s recession. Deterioration of working conditions, overtime work of employees and its adverse effects on their health, has become a hotly debated social issue. This paper focused on the relationship between overtime work and health of employees, whose related issue has been increasingly addressed in literature.

In this paper, we present a theoretical model based on our hypothesis that overtime work of employees is implicitly built into a firm’s promotion system. That is, a typical employee has choices to allocate his time per period between health production and overtime work in the firm. Better health results in higher expected utility of income, while overtime work brings about higher wages through job promotion.

The following predictions are provided in our theoretical model: first, excessive overtime work will cause health deterioration of individual employees. Second, the incentives of a typical employee accepting overtime work is influenced by the parameter attached with the promotion system of a firm, ultimately leading to higher income in the next term. Third, a more efficient individual reflected by more years of education completed tends to have less overtime work per period than one with less education. Finally, the effect of the unemployment rate reflecting labor market conditions on overtime work of employees depends on the employment adjustment factor in the firm in the short run and the via-health effect in the long run.

This paper provides the empirical analysis to test our theoretical model. Our analysis used micro data of 6,985 individuals from the first National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98) made by the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) of the Japan Society of Family Sociology (JSFS; Nihon Kazoku Shakai Gakkai, in Japanese) and provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. To avoid sample bias due to the observations for individuals who report 0 working hour per month, we use Tobit regression censored variable by variable. Our empirical results show: first, the causal chain goes from better health of employees to more overtime work and eventually to a deterioration of employee’s health; second, years of education completed by individuals, reflecting efficiency at work, is negatively associated with overtime work hours.

In other words, more efficient individuals tend to choose less overtime work. Third, overtime work of employees is strongly cyclical – falling during an economic recession, which indirectly supports the evidence from US studies that health improves in a recession. Fourth, among the socio-demographic individual characteristics studied here, the factors hindering job promotion of employees such as having the elderly to care at home and being female, are strongly and negatively associated with overtime work of employees.

Despite the fact that Japan enjoys high longevity, there is still room left for the government to reduce individual health problems reported in the 1990s. One way to promote health of employees is to reduce excessive overtime work of employees. This can be implemented in practice if firms and the Japanese government reconsider the present promotion systems which are not explicitly expressed in the labor contract between employers and employees. Otherwise, the health of employees who work overtime will continue to deteriorate.

References