Jason Goddard G*
Wake Forest University, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,Investment Real Estate, Wells Fargo Bank, N. Main Street 100, Winston-Salem, 27101, North Carolina, USA
Received date; March 19, 2014; Accepted date: April 26, 2014; Published date: May 10, 2014
Citation: Jason Goddard G (2014) The Kano Model and the Future of the European Union: An Attitude Assessment of European Citizenry. Bus Eco J 5:95. doi: 10.4172/2151-6219.100095
Copyright: © 2014 Goddard GJ. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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This study utilizes the Kano model to assess the attitudes/opinions of citizens in Germany and France on political and economic issues related to the maturing of the European Union. The study attempts to assess current salient political and economic concerns of European citizenry via the Kano survey research technique. The survey respondents were asked to answer 20 questions concerning economic and political issues to determine areas of concern that the French and German governments should consider in order to enhance the satisfaction of their citizens with the overall political and economic climate within the EU. The survey was conducted to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The increased pressures associated with further EU integration and expansion adds credence to the timeliness and importance of this study. The survey results indicate that there are divergences of opinion between the surveyed countries, and that future research will help shed further light on European enlargement and integration.
Kano model; European Union Integration and Expansion; Free Trade; Multiculturalism; Germany; France
During 2008, which was the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the European Union (EU) appeared at a crossroads. After successfully launching a common currency over the majority of its member states, and after expanding the European Union from 15 member countries to now 28, several questions remain as to what directions the economic union will head over the coming years. The much-lauded successes in the EU are not without accompanying set-backs. Crucial questions remain surrounding whether the European Union continues to expand, whether the current version of the EU Constitution be accepted, and what it truly means to be European in today’s multicultural, highly-integrated society.
These questions and other important issues remain to be answered. While the current version of the EU Constitution has not been ratified, the authors of this article feel that the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome represented a good time to ask the public their opinions on the future of the EU. Given that France and Germany have historically been the main powers behind the thrust of progress seen in the European Union, these two countries were chosen for the implementation of a survey based on the Kano model. For the first country surveyed, MBA students from the University of North Carolina-Greensboro (UNCG) were asked to interview random citizens on the streets of Paris, France in October of 2007. This was during a week-long “Experience Business Abroad” program, and during the week of “la greve”, or the strike by the railway unions which left Paris immobile for three days. MBA students were instructed to ask random English-speaking citizens in Paris to complete a survey utilizing the Kano model. For the second country surveyed, students at the University of Applied Sciences in Ludwigshafen, Germany were asked to complete a survey, which was very similar to the French Café Kano Survey. This German survey implementation was conducted in two phases, the first in December 2007 and the second in May 2008.
Most prior studies utilizing the Kano model, (such as Löfgren and Wittell [1,2]; Kuo ; Tan et al. ; Lee and Chen [5,6]; Lee ; Serelli and Kauffman ; Tontini ; Yadav and Goel ; Zielke ; Gregory and Parsa , Dominic and Palumbo ; Cheng HT and Cheng KM ; Tontini et al. , and Yeh and Chen ), have focused on traditional manufacturing or service environments. These studies have typically been coupled with techniques such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD) to see if individual product and service characteristics can be better understood using the Kano model. Other studies have attempted to increase the scope of the Kano model to include managerial assessment enhancements in annual employee evaluations, as well as organizational competitive advantages in knowledge management (see Phillips JN and Phillips SM ; Matzler et al. ; Chen and Su ; Yang ; Chen et al. , and Shyu et al. ).
There have been some recent studies of the European Union with regard to satisfaction (Karp ; IPSOS INRA ; Böhnke ; Welsch and Bonn ; Pittau et al. ; Hobolt ; and Linz , but the existing surveys have not utilized the Kano model and have been focused primarily on job satisfaction or specific consumer issues as opposed to overall economic and political concerns. Our present study seeks to answer whether the Kano model can be used to assess national cultural differences and opinions, rather than its primary use as a model for customer orientation, as the aforementioned studies would indicate. If the Kano model can be used for this purpose, what might this imply for assessing differences between nations in matters considered to be basic needs, must-be requirements, and matters that are attractive to the survey respondents? If the Kano model can be used to differentiate national preferences, it might be a solid step toward addressing some of the issues that the public at large sees as problematic in the European Union specifically, and, more generally, in today’s global environment.
In the pages that follow, we will discuss how our Kano survey of the EU was implemented, and the results of the study.
Tentative Relational Hypothesis 1: The Kano Model can be utilized to Differentiate National Preferences on Political and Economic Issues
The survey respondents were different in France and Germany, in that in France, we sought opinions of random individuals, with the only requirements being that they were willing to complete the survey (either orally or written) and that they spoke English. Recognizing English speakers raises conceptual challenges; nevertheless, 50 percent of young Europeans begin learning a foreign language in primary school and English is the most widely taught foreign language, according to Europa, the European Union portal site (Europa, “Language Teaching”, ). Table 1 shows the demographic breakdown of the French respondents.
The results reveal that no particular group was surveyed over another group. This is distinctly different from the German survey respondents, as all of the respondents were university students, with most of them being between the ages of 18 and 25. By surveying one consistent group from an age perspective (Germany), and one random group from an age perspective (France), we wished to see if there were any differences of opinion as to the future of the European Union from an age perspective. The demographics of the German survey are shown in Table 2.
Tentative Relational Hypothesis 2: The Survey of Younger EU Members (Germany) will tend to be more open to Globalization, Increased EU Expansion, and Multiculturalism
Since the younger adults have grown up more accustomed to multiculturalism in education and political discourse, have been beneficiaries of liberal economic policy, and are further removed from times of political upheaval in continental Europe, the authors surmise that the survey results show that age plays a significant factor in having good feelings about the future of the European Union. Since the demographic variable of citizenship did not necessarily show that the survey respondents considered themselves “European”, it will be interesting to see whether our second hypothesis proves to be plausible. In general, Germany has provided the most funding for the various mechanisms of the European Union, has a strong interest in the European Central Bank’s operating procedures, and has had more successes in terms of globally-oriented companies. For these reasons, we felt that our second hypothesis would prove to be plausible.
Tentative Relational Hypothesis 3: French Citizens will have a More Positive View of Migration Policy than the German Citizenry
A higher prevalence of multiculturalism in France is shown via the relative ease of immigrants obtaining citizenship and the acceptance of immigrants into France with limited restrictions (at least until recently) (Hegen D ). This hypothesis is also supported by the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany, and the perceived problem of this ethnic group being able to successfully become “accultured” to German expectations. Acculturation is here defined as the process by which a person not only understands a foreign culture, but also modifies and adapts his or her behavior to make it compatible with the new culture (Ajami and Goddard ).
Tentative Relational Hypothesis 4: Both Germany and France will answer positively to the Questions about Religious Tolerance, but will also reject the Question Concerning Allowing Turkey Membership into the European Union
This hypothesis is supported with the knowledge that Turkey’s membership process into the European Union has been slow, and various different reasons have been provided. For example, with the admission of the southern part of Cyprus into the EU in 2005, the primary argument against Turkey’s membership (geography) became problematic. Additionally, higher levels of interest rates and inflation rates in Turkey, when compared to the majority of continental Europe, have made membership into the EU difficult from an economic standpoint. Since the most recent expansion of the EU, negotiations with Turkey have not produced an agreed timetable, or even an agreement on when to discuss their possible admission.
The authors of this article have published a book on the global implications of customer relationship management where the concept of the Kano Model is explored in further detail (Raab et al., Gower Publishing ). To summarize for our purposes, the Kano model was created by Japanese theorist Noriaki Kano in the early 1980s. The purpose of the survey is to assess the satisfaction of a customer to a specific feature of a product or service offering. Survey respondents are asked a series of question pairs, with one question being called a “positive question”, where a specific feature is exhibited, while the second question is called a “negative question”, which assesses the respondent’s feelings if that same feature was not present. The answers to the questions are then broken down into the categories known as “attractive”, “one dimensional”, “must-be”, “Indifferent”, “reverse”, and “question”. Table 3 below helps to illustrate which question combinations achieve which categories of responses.
As Table 3 illustrates, if a survey respondent answers “I like it that way” to the positive-oriented question, and answers “it must be that way” for the negative-oriented question, then this feature is categorized as “attractive”.
Our survey will seek to assess the satisfaction levels of the various components that compose the European Union and its place in an increasingly integrated global society. The surveys asked specific questions in both the positive and the negative case in order to assess how a specific variable should be categorized in both of the respondent countries. We decided to utilize the Kano Model for this survey in order to rank the questions in order of either dissatisfaction or satisfaction. This has traditionally been done via the calculation of coefficients of satisfaction (CS+) and dissatisfaction (CS-). Table 4 below illustrates how these coefficients are calculated.
The coefficient provides information about how securely the survey issue is in the position to increase satisfaction, or how negatively satisfaction would be affected in the event that this product feature was not being fulfilled. The measure of CS- is appended by a negative sign, which illustrates that the non-fulfillment of a promised or expected service induces dissatisfaction (which is defined as a -1 value). The closer the value is to -1, the more people were unhappy with the feature. The positive satisfaction coefficient (CS+) ranges from 0 to 1.
The closer the value is to 1, the more influence the variable has on the respondent’s satisfaction.
A value near zero signifies that if this feature is not fulfilled, it produces hardly any movement toward dissatisfaction (Raab et al. ).
For purposes of the study, a response would be classified as attractive (a) when respondents chose “I like it that way” to the positive-oriented statement, such as “the average work week should be extended”, and if the same respondent answered that they could “live with it that way” for the negative-oriented statement, such as “the average work week should not be extended” (among other scenarios as depicted in Table 5, below).
A survey respondent would be classified as must be (m) if they respond “It must be that way” for the positive-oriented statement, such as “Turkey should be admitted into the European Union”, and if the same respondent answered “I dislike it that way” for the negative-oriented statement, such as “Turkey should not be admitted into the European Union” (Table 5).
A respondent is considered one-dimensional (o) when they responded “I like it that way” to the positive-oriented statement, such as “in the future, the most recent version of the EU Constitution should be adopted”, and if the same respondent answered that they would “dislike it that way” for the negative-oriented statement, such as “in the future, the most recent version of the EU Constitution should not be adopted”.
A response would be classified as reverse (r) if the respondent chose “I dislike it that way” to a positive-oriented statement such as “in the future, Germany should pursue a free trade economic policy”, and if the same respondent answered that they would “like it that way” for the negative-oriented statement, such as “in the future, Germany should not pursue a free trade economic policy” (see Table 5). This is categorized as a reverse statement, as it is the opposite of what the survey intended/expected.
Other possible answers that a respondent could have selected for our version of the Kano Model are questionable (q) and indifferent (i). A respondent’s answer is deemed “questionable” when it does not make sense, such as answering that they like both the functional and dysfunctional scenarios. As shown in Table 3, there are numerous answer combinations that can be classified as “indifferent”. These responses indicate that the respondent is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the question or feature being answered.
In this section of the paper, we will discuss each question in turn, and provide both the raw data in terms of question answers, as well as a summary of how the question pairs (positive and negative) corresponded in terms of the classifications of the Kano model, as well as coefficients of satisfaction and dissatisfaction values. Since this is the first time that the Kano model has been used for this purpose, it may be helpful to review both the raw data totals as well as the more traditional Kano approach.
The following Table 5 summarizes the 20 questions that were asked (in both a positive and a negative form) of our 30 respondents from France and our 42 respondents from Germany.
The first question in the survey discusses the need for a free trade economic policy (Table 6). While the survey respondents in France were not required to disclose their familiarity with what a free trade economic policy means, there has been enough popular media attention to the issue so as to allow for them to provide a reasonably educated opinion on the matter. This assumption is also helped in that our survey respondents were required to be at least bilingual (as the surveys were conducted in English only), which might imply a higher level of education, and thus understanding of economic issues.
While the raw data seemed to indicate that the survey respondents in both countries would view free trade policy favorably, it was calculated as “must be” for France. Thus, rather than having an overly favorable view of free trade policy, it is possible that some of the political debates in France between President Sarkozy and various left-wing political parties and unions may have affected the issue in the minds of the respondents of our small survey. Free Trade policy was categorized as “indifferent” for our German respondents, again revealing a lack of excitement over the issue in general.
The second question was customized for the country where the survey was being implemented (Table 7). The question aimed to gauge whether the citizens of Germany and France were in favor of increased ties with the United States or were less excited about the prospect. German citizens were asked if Chancellor Merkel should strengthen ties with the U.S., and French citizens were queried if (then) President Sarkozy should increase ties with the U.S.
As is obvious from the tables above, there was little difference of opinion on this issue among our survey respondents. There was not a majority that felt strongly in favor of strengthening ties with the United States in either France or Germany.
The third question in the survey asked respondents how they felt about the most recent version of the EU constitution being adopted (Table 8). Given that neither Germany nor France has put the issue to a popular vote, this represented an interesting chance to understand how our small population felt about this issue.
The raw data reveals that a majority of survey respondents who feel as though the current version of the EU constitution should be adopted. This is not surprising given that the two countries surveyed here have been the traditional catalysts for increased integration and unity on the continent, at least since the Treaty of Rome was endorsed fifty years ago. The Kano analysis reveals a slightly higher level of dissatisfaction in France should the constitution not be adopted, but a relatively low level of satisfaction in both Germany and France for adoption.
The fourth question deals with increasing working hours in both countries surveyed (Table 9). This question was included in the survey because many economists have noted that the lack of competitiveness in labor markets in Germany and France is caused, in part, by the shortened number of working hours in these two countries. Since most other industrialized countries utilize the 5-day, 40-hour work week, when comparison statistics are used for making offshore location and outsourcing decisions, the effect of the shorter work week in Germany and France is to make their hourly wage levels appear higher by comparison (Sinn ). While the real culprit, in terms of higher wage rates may, in fact, be the prevalence of strong labor unions in Germany and France that argue for higher than sustainable wage rate levels. This question was included in order to see if the survey respondents understood the issue at hand and had any strong feelings about this issue.
French respondents were of very different opinions about this issue, hence the Kano statistics which are right down the middle of the satisfaction portfolio (-0.50, 0.50), achieving “must be” status. The Germans, on the other hand, had very low levels of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction for this issue.
Given that the railway strike in France was due, in part, to the Sarkozy government’s considerations of tax cuts and other economic liberalization efforts, the fifth question asked the respondents whether the French or German government should pursue tax cuts (Table 10). Given the turmoil of the railway strike in France during the French survey implementation, there could have been some influence on the results for the French respondents.
While 73% of the respondents in France felt that the ability to strike was either “like it” or “must be”, overall, the Kano statistics revealed “must be” categorization. This is more than likely due to the high level of neutral responses for both the positive and the negative questions.
The sixth question asks our survey respondents their opinions concerning globalization, including migration policy (Table 11). The words “including migration policy” were included in the question to allow the survey respondent to realize that migration policy is a significant part of globalization: typically, globalization is seen purely from a trade and job outsourcing and off-shoring viewpoint.
There were very few differences in the two country’s responses for this category. Neither the German nor French respondents had a particularly high level of attraction to globalization. In the end, however, both sets of data seem to indicate that the respondents feel that globalization is here to stay, and is something that they must embrace, like it or not.
The prior question leads directly to our seventh question (Table 12). The survey respondents were asked whether companies should pursue outsourcing of jobs to remain competitive. Given the various levels of success achieved in both French and German industry from the outsourcing of jobs to lower-cost offshore locations (whether it be to colonial ties in Africa for France, or to Eastern Europe for Germany), this question was included to help assess popular sentiment on this issue in the surveyed countries. While the German survey respondents were university students who have been educated as to the benefits and trade-offs of an outsourcing strategy, we do not have this same level of confidence in the French respondents given the random nature of survey implementation.
We were surprised to see that the German university students had an indifferent opinion as to “job outsourcing”. Both data sets had just about the same level of dissatisfaction with this topic, with both showing “indifferent” as the most frequent answer pairing.
The eighth question is crucial for the survey as it relates directly to our fourth hypothesis and indirectly relates to our third hypothesis (Table 13). Survey respondents were asked to assess their feelings regarding the possibility of Turkey joining the European Union. The question did not contain a timetable for entry, so the primary point of the question was to obtain the feelings about whether Turkey should ever be allowed to join the EU.
While both data sets showed as “indifferent”, here is an example of where viewing the raw data, rather than simply reviewing the Kano statistics, is helpful. The CS- and CS+ calculations do not include “reverse” scores, which were high for this question in Germany: the most popular response in the German sample was the opposite of the question asked. In other words, the survey respondents would like it if Turkey did not join the EU, and would not like it if they did. This is in stark contrast to the most common answer in the French survey, which is “neutral”. Given Germany’s large Turkish population relative to France’s (roughly 2.6 million in Germany and approximately 500 thousand in France), the Kano model alone would not have been helpful in determining the true voice of the people. While the Kano model showed indifference in Germany, the true answer appears to be “reverse”.
The ninth question discussed the popularity of labor unions in both France and Germany (Table 14). Survey respondents were asked whether it was a good idea for their national labor unions to be able to strike, regardless of the cost and consequence. Each national survey undertaken asked respondents the question in relation to the home country. In other words, German respondents were not asked their opinions of French labor unions, and vice versa.
As the data shows, there was broad agreement on this issue in both data sets. The most common answer was “I dislike it” for both questions, which might mean that the phrasing of the question was suspect. However, the Kano statistics reveal a low level of satisfaction with labor strikes, and a relatively high level of dissatisfaction. Both Germany and France are categorized as “must be” for this question, which is consistent with the social-democratic form of government in both countries. The populace does not like strikes, but sees them as a necessity.
The tenth question attempts to achieve clarity on the issue of monetary policy in the EU (Table 15). Survey respondents were asked whether their national monetary policy should be run by the European Central Bank as opposed to a more nationalistic alternative. This question seeks clarity on the current feelings concerning national sovereignty issues especially as they relate to central banking policy.
The statistics reveal some interesting paradigms on this question. France had a much higher percentage of respondents disliking monetary policy being run by a group other than the ECB. The German respondents were indifferent to this question, possibly given the historical lineage of the Bundesbank in Germany and the ECB (Hayo , and OECD ). The survey respondents in France did not have as strong a substitute organization in their minds, thus the French respondents felt that it “must be” that the ECB should run French monetary policy.
This question deals directly with the freedom of religion (Table 16). If the respondents had concerns about Turkey becoming a member, and if they had apprehensions about a liberal migration policy for the EU in general, this question aimed to assess whether “German citizens” or “French citizens” should be allowed to pursue freedom of religion in all circumstances. Again, each national survey only asked respondents to assess whether their home country should have these freedoms.
Both data sets scored high on the frequency of “dislike it” to the question about citizens not having the freedom of religion in all circumstances. Both countries felt that the issue was something that they needed to have, but it did not score high on satisfaction for either data set. The French data set scored very high on dissatisfaction, which implies that the lack of religious freedom would be very disagreeable to those surveyed.
Question twelve deals with the implementation of agricultural policy in Europe (Table 17). This has been one of the defining issues in the lack of progress of the Doha Development Agenda, as both the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU and the various mechanisms of farm industry subsidy and protection in the United States have proven to be one of the hardest industries in terms of obtaining international agreement for lessening of trade barriers (Sachs ; Bhagwati ; Lal ; Boko and Seck ; and OECD ). Each national survey asked whether it made sense for the national government to pursue protective barriers in the agricultural sector. The implication of asking the question in a national viewpoint is that those who feel that their home country ought to lower barriers in the farming sector would more than likely have these same opinions at the international level. Those who believe that national barriers should be maintained at home, but expect unilateral reduction in other countries, have been the source of the trouble with this issue.
Unfortunately, the survey respondents didn’t have much of an opinion on this question, as the most common response was neutral for both data sets. It appears, at least based on our sample surveys that more work needs to be done on educating the public on the importance of this issue.
The thirteenth question in our Kano survey concerned future expansion in the European Union (Table 18). Respondents were asked whether the EU should continue expanding its membership. The question did not imply a timetable for said expansion or any suggestions regarding which countries the EU should consider as possible new entrants. This question was trying to assess the “bigger vs. deeper” debate that has raged in Europe for many years—especially as the EU has expanded into fewer and less economically similar locations.
Neither set of respondents appeared too excited about the prospects of continued EU expansion. The French were closer to registering an opinion other than “indifferent”, while the Germans were clear in their opinions. The raw data shows that over half of the German respondents dislike future EU expansion, while 38% of the same respondents like the idea of the EU not expanding. In France, 40% of the respondents would dislike it if the EU did not expand. This is yet another example where the raw data tells a much different story than the Kano model.
This question deals with the French government’s prior discussions about pursuing a Mediterranean Union (Table 19). Since Germany would not be included in this proposed grouping of countries, German respondents were asked their opinion on whether they would be in favor of France pursuing this additional arrangement. Since this would be outside of Germany’s commitments to the EU, German citizens may have either shown disinterest in this question, or a preference one way or the other for French involvement.
The majority of German citizens surveyed were indifferent to this question, which was similar to the opinion of our French respondents: 43% of Germans answered that they would dislike it if France pursued the Mediterranean Union, while only 33% of the respondents would like it if they did not pursue it. Overall, there was not much to glean from the responses.
Question fifteen directly relates to the future of the economic partnership between Germany and France (Table 20). Both national surveys had the question posed as “should the domestic country increase its economic partnership with the foreign country”, so that the question assessed the home country’s willingness to increase the economic partnership between Germany and France. The phrasing of this question could help to show if one country or the other felt that they have done enough in the past to increase the partnership already.
The French respondents were clear here: they were in favor of an increased partnership with Germany, and would be dissatisfied if it were not so. This is in contrast to their indifference to the earlier question regarding increasing ties with the United States. The Germans, on the other hand, registered as indifferent to an increased partnership with France.
Since the questions were either being completed by students (in Germany) or requested for completion by students (in France), we felt that a question concerning proposed changes to European universities was appropriate for this survey. Both German and French respondents were asked whether their domestic universities should have more control over which students were admitted (Table 21).
The Kano data sets did not reveal anything particularly interesting for this question. The raw data did show some preferences in the positive responses in Germany, as well as the negative responses in France, but overall, both data sets proved indifferent.
One significant part of culture and an issue of EU integration is language (Ajami and Goddard , and OECD ). This question asked respondents whether immigrants to Germany or France “must adapt to” German or French language and culture (Table 22). The answer to this question would be interesting to view in terms of the answers to question nineteen on multiculturalism, question six on globalization and migration issues, and question eleven regarding the freedom of religion.
Both countries surveyed exhibited “one-dimensional” characteristics here. In other words, both countries would like if immigrants adapted to the local language and culture, and would not like it if they did not. One of the highest scores in our entire survey was registered for the German data set, where 81% of the respondents would dislike it if immigrants did not adapt to local culture and language. Given that the answers registered higher satisfaction and dissatisfaction scores than did the prior questions on religious freedom and embracing globalization, it appears that the opinions of those surveyed were that religious freedom and globalization are necessary facets of today’s integrated societies, but they still want immigrants to honor the age-old adage of “when in Rome, do as the Romans”.
Question eighteen introduces the topic of government assistance being increased for purposes of retraining of the unemployed workers in Germany and France (Table 23). Answers to this question would be interesting in comparison to question four dealing with the possibility of increasing working week hours, question six regarding globalization and migration policy, question seven regarding outsourcing of jobs, and question one regarding free trade economic policy. Given that the national response to job losses owing to globalization in the United States (primarily in lower-paying manufacturing positions) has been focused, government-sponsored retraining efforts (Goddard and Ajami ), this survey question sought to determine the level of interest in this option in the opinions of the respondents.
The opinions of the French respondents were much clearer than the German respondents on this issue. The French registered as “one dimensional”, thus showing a slightly positive satisfaction for increased government assistance for retraining the unemployed, and a higher level of dissatisfaction if it were not the case. German respondents were indifferent to this question, and this could be because the respondents felt that the efforts of the German government on this issue were sufficient: indeed, government assistance to the unemployed in Germany is among the world’s most generous (Sinn ). These responses can be compared to the indifference shown regarding increasing working hours (which may help to hire additional workers and to create more employment opportunities via foreign direct investment as increased labor hours with sustained productivity will help bring down wage rates as compared with other countries where workers are putting in a full work week). The survey respondents in France were in favor of more government assistance but not for more working hours for the labor force. This is interesting in light of the subsequent election of Socialist party candidate Francois Hollande in 2012, which would seem to mirror these views.
Question nineteen deals with embracing multiculturalism (Table 24). This question directly relates to our first hypothesis as mentioned earlier. The question was phrased in such a manner that the survey respondent was asked to react to whether his or her home country embracing multiculturalism would be a good strategy in the future.
Both countries surveyed had similar opinions when viewed in terms of the Kano statistics. France had a higher level of dissatisfaction should a strategy of multiculturalism not be followed. These responses track equally with the earlier question of embracing globalization. In the minds of the survey respondents, embracing globalization and pursuing multiculturalism are necessary in today’s global economy, but they are not too satisfied with the situation.
The final question in our Kano survey involves university emphasis on education (Table 25). Survey respondents were asked whether they would be in favor of their home country’s universities placing a higher emphasis on technology and innovation in education. In an increasingly integrated global society, the strength of a nation’s research and development as well as creative and entrepreneurial energy are a key success factors now and in the future.
Both data sets were clearly one dimensional for this question. Both would be highly dissatisfied if their respective country did not pursue technology and innovation in education, but were less satisfied if these strategies were pursued.
We began this paper by asking whether the Kano model could be relevant in a study like this. While there were are few questions where the Kano statistics did not relay the entire story, for the most part, the Kano model appears to have been successful in determining the level of satisfaction and dissatisfaction achieved by survey respondents in terms of the questions posed in our EU Kano survey. One thing must be mentioned: none of the questions in our survey achieved the category of “attractive”. Given the lack of recent success of the EU, whether it be the stalled constitution effort, the rejection by Ireland of the EU reform treaty (Pogatchnik ), or the EU sovereign debt crisis, there have not been too many areas exhibited on an international scale for attractive features of the EU. Perhaps our results are not too surprising! The following table itemizes the questions categorized as either must be or one dimensional for both data sets.
Given the fact that the Kano model was used in order to differentiate how different opinions on political and economic issues affect satisfaction, the first hypothesis should be accepted. Now that we have addressed our first primary hypothesis, what remains is how our other three hypotheses fared in the actual survey results. We will take each of the hypotheses in turn below.
Our second hypothesis was that the survey of younger EU members (Germany) will tend to be more open to globalization, increased, EU expansion, and multiculturalism. This hypothesis does not appear to be validated by the results of the survey. As shown in tables 26 and 27, both the Germans and the French considered embracing globalization and multiculturalism as “must be” factors, and neither data set considered EU expansion to be a satisfying feature of the survey. Table 28 below illuminates just how consistent the indifference was for any question relating to the EU.
Only France showed any interest in the questions pertaining to the EU, considering the EU constitution (question 3) to be a “must be” requirement, and the French and German partnership (question 15) to be a one-dimensional feature in the survey. The only question without a 25 indifference rating for Germany was the Turkish membership in the EU (question 8), which provided a reverse classification.
As to the openness to globalization and multiculturalism questions, the Table 29 below does not seem to indicate much difference of opinion for the two data sets.
Given the similarity of the responses for questions associated with the EU, globalization, and culture, the second hypothesis must be rejected.
Our third hypothesis was that French citizens will have a more positive view of migration policy than the German citizenry. The above Table (Table 29) on globalization and culture show that there were not major differences between the two data sets for issues that directly and indirectly address migration policy. The third hypothesis must be rejected.
Our fourth hypothesis was that both Germany and France will answer positively to the questions about religious tolerance, but will also reject the question concerning allowing Turkey membership into the European Union. Based on the information discussed in question 11, both countries responded that the freedom of religion is a must be feature, but the two data sets were not in agreement about Turkey joining the EU. While the Kano statistics revealed indifference for both countries, a look at the raw data showed that the Germans were not in favor of Turkish membership, as was discussed earlier in the paper. While the rejection of this hypothesis is not as obvious as with hypothesis number 2, it would not appear to be validated with our survey.
Table 30 below summarizes the questions in the survey which pertain all or in part to Turkish membership in the EU.
Overall, there was not much difference in the responses on the Turkish membership questions, or the related questions of EU expansion, immigrants adapting to the local culture, and embracing globalization and multiculturalism.
Now that we have discussed the results of the survey with regard to our initial hypothesized relationships, a few items remain. We would like to discuss whether there was anything that the survey revealed that was surprising, and given the overall results of the survey, if there were any lessons on what national governments and academic practitioners should do in the future to improve the public image of the European Union.
The areas that showed surprising results were in government intervention and labor issues. At first glance, these would not appear to be areas for disagreement between Germany and France, but our Kano survey did reveal some differences. In terms of government intervention, the French were more interested in seeing increased unemployment assistance and tax cuts than the German survey respondents. Table 31 itemizes the differences in terms of questions pertaining to government and labor issues.
For labor-related issues, the French survey respondents had more clear opinions on free trade economic policy and increased work hours than their German counterparts. While neither data set provided an “attractive feature”, the differences between the two national surveys imply that there may be a use for the Kano model in future studies of overall citizen satisfaction with political and economic issues.
While the Kano model has been used in a non-standard way, the model appears to be a useful beginning regarding important and useful suggestions for cross-cultural and border differences dealing with mindset, attitudes, and sentiments toward overall cross-cultural perceptions. Empirically mapping out soft dimensions of cultural sentiments, mindsets, and attributes would help introduce a new stream of research that tends to fuse together soft cultural dimensions with empirical variables and dimensions. It is a beginning that should further our understanding of cross-cultural differences.
Since the Kano model prescribes resolving “must be” issues before attractive needs, it would appear that the next step for EU governments and practitioners would be to prepare more focused Kano studies concerning issues seen as “must be” or “one dimensional” in the hopes of determining what, if anything, can be done to create opportunities for “attractive” features within the EU context. Since this is the first study of economic and political issues utilizing the Kano model, there is ample room for further study to better understand the benefits that the Kano model can provide in terms of increasing overall satisfaction levels of EU citizens with their national and regional governments and businesses. Our small survey is a starting point on something very important: finding a means of creating the excitement in the EU citizenry that comes with satisfaction with their political and economic alternatives. If such satisfaction can be generated, it would appear that the road to increased economic and political integration of EU members (if this is indeed the desired course of action) would be possible. What is simply not palatable are any further advances in economic, political, and regional integration without seeking the support of the citizens whom will be most affected.
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