Offender Diversion into Substance Use Disorder Treatment: Demographic Variation in the Economic Impact of California’s Proposition 36Douglas M Anglin*, Adi Jaffee, Bohdan Nysok, Darren Urada and Elizabeth Evans
Professor, UCLA Integrated Substance Use Programs, David Geffin School of Medicine, USA
- Corresponding Author:
- Douglas M Anglin
Professor, UCLA Integrated Substance Use Programs
David Geffin School of Medicine, 1260 South Sepulveda Ave.
Suite 200, Los Angeles, CA 90025, USA
E-mail: [email protected]
Received date: July 10, 2013; Accepted date: October 24, 2013; Published date: October 30, 2013
Citation: Anglin DM, Jaffee A, Nysok B, Urada D, Evans E (2013) Offender Diversion into Substance Use Disorder Treatment: Demographic Variation in the Economic Impact of California’s Proposition 36. J Alcoholism Drug Depend 1:140. doi: 10.4172/2329-6488.1000140
Copyright: © 2013 Anglin DM, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Context: California implemented a voter-approved offender diversion program, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA; also known as Proposition 36), in July 2001. SACPA offered probation or continued parole with substance abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration or supervision without treatment for adult offenders convicted of drug offenses and for probationers and parolees who violated drug-related supervision conditions.
Objectives: To describe demographic variation in governmental costs associated with SACPA.
Methods: Administrative data were used to define control and intervention cohorts of drug offenders meeting SACPA eligibility criteria in the proximate years before SACPA implementation and for the first year after implementation. Three separate difference-in-differences regression models estimated the effect of SACPA on the total and domain-specific costs to state and county governments incurred for white, Black, and Hispanic offenders. The main covariates of interest were sex, race, and age, as well as the interactions between these and SACPA participation. All analyses controlled for county-level crime at baseline and the change in crime rates throughout the 60-month analysis period.
Results: The greatest average savings ($6,052 per individual) were realized for Black male offenders, with lower cost savings for Hispanics ($3,238) and whites ($2,158). SACPA eligibility resulted in substantially lower savings for female participants, primarily due to increased arrest and conviction costs. A significant sex-by-age interaction showed monotonically decreasing costs associated with age for men but not for women.
Conclusions: These results indicate SACPA’s effectiveness in reducing government costs for male offenders with fewer, and inconsistent, effects on savings for female offender. Implications for the selection of eligible offenders and improvements in services that meet offender needs specific to county-level circumstances are discussed.