The Significance of Encapsulation of Visual Perception for Philosophy of Mind and Aesthetic Analysis
Vladimir J Konecni*
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, California 92093-0109, USA
- *Corresponding Author:
- Vladimir J. Konecni
Department of Psychology
University of California, San Diego
California 92093-0109, USA
E-mail: [email protected]
Received Date: October 14, 2015; Accepted Date: October 17, 2015; Published Date: October 21, 2015
Citation: Konecni VJ (2015) The Significance of Encapsulation of Visual Perception for Philosophy of Mind and Aesthetic Analysis. Clin Exp Psychol 1: 102. doi: 10.4172/2471-2701.100102
Copyright: © 2015 Konecni VJ. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
This Opinion Article highlights three sets of important implications of the very recent work by C. Firestone and B. Scholl on the encapsulation of visual perception: (a) methodological implications, especially with regard to experimental areas of cognitive science, such as cognitive social psychology; (b) implications of interest to philosophers of mind, some of whose more extravagant recent claims have been based on the assumption of “topdown” cognitive effects on perception; and (c) implications that challenge some recent work in philosophical and psychological aesthetics regarding art expertise, as well as defend the logic of A. Danto’s theorizing from attacks that are based on the assumption of “top-down” cognitive effects.