At the late of Nineteen Seventies, Egypt was impelled to create eight nuclear energy plants associate degree to develop expertise at the rear finish of a fuel cycle and was ended many contracts with an nameless foreign company to create the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant. Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant may be a hot cell laboratory advanced dedicated to perform bench-scale chemical science experiments as well as the separation of atomic number 94 and atomic number 92 from the spent fuel rods of the ETRR-1 analysis reactor and was established in 1982. HPP was originally designed as a nuclear reprocessing facility. The HPP consists of 3 laboratories, the primary laboratory consists of 3 hot with the primary module, is secure particle cell dedicated for mechanical cutting off of analysis reactor fuel, it had been unfinished attributable to the lack to secure the required export licence for the cutting off instrumentation from the foreign merchandiser. The second module is dissolvent and mixer-settlers for initial stage fission product separation. The third module, was designed for waste verification with no instrumentation had been put in. The second laboratory contains 2 modules, module 4 that may be a lead secure glove box for second stage fission product separation victimisation mixer settlers, whereas module five, associate degree is an unprotected glove box for the separation of atomic number 94 from atomic number 92. The third laboratory consists of 2 connected glove box lines appropriate for atomic number 94 chemistry however that contain no instrumentation. HPP possess a minor atomic number 94 process capability and unable to utilise and extract weapons-grade atomic number 94 from the spent fuel of the analysis reactors attributable to the lack to finish the ability, however, Egypt set to use one cell of the HPP at intervals the framework of a project for the management of unused and orphan hot sealed sources, that provides Egypt with the analysis capabilities on the back-end of fuel cycle.
In early 2001, the International energy Agency detected particles of actinides and fission product close to the HPP facility, which shed light-weight on the existence of the HPP. In Gregorian calendar month 2004 and Gregorian calendar month 2005, Egypt declared that, in 1987, it had administered acceptance tests within the HPP victimisation uni-radiated nitrate in chemical reagents purchased from the native market whereas the nitrate had been mixed with an answer obtained from the dissolution of domestically created scrap UO2 pellets. Egypt rationalized that it didnt inform the IAEA regarding the ability, materials nor their use within the tests because the HPP neer completed and it had been designed for bench scale chemical science experiments, whereas Egypt ought to declared the HPP to the Agency as early as potential before the introduction of nuclear material into the ability, consistent with the Safeguards Agreement that came into force in 1982. Therefore, between 2004 and 2006, Egypt had submitted style data for the HPP and had provided inventory modification reports (ICRs) with relevance the acceptance tests. In 2009, The IAEAs Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2008 concludes that earlier problems with unacknowledged nuclear activities and material reported to the Board of Governors in Feb 2005 arent any longer outstanding.