ISSN: 2157-2526

Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense
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  • Short Communication   
  • J Bioterror Biodef 9: 159,
  • DOI: 10.4172/2157-2526.1000159

Biodata Risks and Synthetic Biology: A Critical Juncture

Diane DiEuliis1*#, Charles D Lutes1 and James Giordano2,3#
1US Department of Defense, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, United States
2Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Neuroethics Studies Program-Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, United States
3Center for Policy on Emerging Technologies, , Washington, DC, United States
#Contributed equally to this work
*Corresponding Author : Diane DiEuliis, US Department of Defense, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, United States, Tel: 202-685-4700, Email: diane.dieuliis.civ@ndu.edu

Received Date: Jan 06, 2018 / Accepted Date: Jan 31, 2018 / Published Date: Feb 07, 2018

Abstract

The tools of synthetic biology and the life sciences are rapidly advancing, as the ability to apply classical engineering to biological systems creates increasing possibilities for innovations in health and medicine, materials science, energy and agriculture. Intrinsic to these capabilities is the mounting ‘digitization of biology’, as the genetic code and its related metadata (including translated proteins, associated functions, herein referred to as “biodata”) are amassed in order to engineer biology for specific purposes. The full spectrum of risks associated with the compilation and use of a wide range of biodata has not been fully identified or comprehensively understood. Further, divergences in traditional attitudes about security among disciplines, namely, biological sciences, engineering, information technology, and data science, complicate discussions on approaches to risk mitigation. To provide a more unified perspective and clarity, we propose that there are unique risks associated with the digitization of biology, represented by overlapping concerns of biosecurity and privacy. We discuss these in three categories of risk: 1) pathogen risks; 2) manufacturing risks, and 3) risks to individual privacy that can allow human harms. Further, we note that there is insufficient address or treatment of these risks in the formulation of ethics, policy and governance. Mitigation of risks will require characterization of all three spheres of risk, acknowledgement that they may require different solutions, and engagement of divergent disciplines and stakeholders to design solutions.

Keywords: Biodata; Biosecurity; Cybersecurity; Privacy; Synthetic biology; Genomic data

Citation: Diane DE, Charles L, James G (2018) Biodata Risks and Synthetic Biology: A Critical Juncture. J Bioterror Biodef 9: 159. Doi: 10.4172/2157-2526.1000159

Copyright: © 2018 Diane DE, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

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